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INTRODUCTION 
Athan Montgomery was injured twice before he was even fully bom--once by Dr. 
Drezga and once by the medical-insurance industry. As a result of Dr. Drezga's 
negligence in delivering him, Athan must go through his life with a traumatic brain injury 
that has left him unable to fully use his left side, with developmental, cognitive, speech 
and balance problems and subject to seizures. And as a result of the medical-insurance 
industry's successful lobbying of the Utah Legislature in the mid 1980s, Athan has not 
been fully compensated for his injuries. The general damage verdict a unanimous jury 
awarded Athan against Dr. Drezga was cut by 80 percent. 
A jury found--and it remains undisputed--that, to fairly and adequately compensate 
Athan for the noneconomic aspects of his injuries, he should receive $1,250,000. The 
trial court awarded Athan only one-fifth of that amount because the legislature, without 
any knowledge of Athan or the facts of his case, determined that no one injured by 
medical negligence should ever receive more than $250,000 in noneconomic damages. 1 
Dr. Drezga and the amici would have this court abdicate its responsibility and 
defer to the legislature in determining the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's damage cap. While some legislative enactments may be entitled to 
deference, when the legislature deprives injured children of their right to a complete 
Although the damage cap was increased in 2001 to try to keep up with 
inflation and although Dr. Drezga repeatedly refers to the cap as a $400,000 cap, the cap 
at issue here is the $250,000 cap applicable to cases that arose before July 1,2001, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996). 
1 
remedy for their injuries, heightened scrutiny is required. The damage cap cannot pass 
such scrutiny. The damage cap is unconstitutional because it violates Athan 
Montgomery's constitutional rights to a remedy, to due process, to the uniform operation 
of the laws and to a jury trial. It also violates the constitutionally mandated separation of 
powers. 
The plaintiffs will fIrst address the general arguments of Dr. Drezga and the amici 
and then address their specifIc constitutional arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LEE v. GAUFIN'S HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS IN UTAH IS DISPOSITIVE OF 
THIS CASE. 
Dr. Drezga argues generally that the damage cap is constitutional because the 
legislature had good reasons to pass the cap, and the cap has achieved its intended 
purpose. The damage cap was passed without any statement of legislative purpose. Dr. 
Drezga claims, however, that the purpose of the cap is the same as the purpose of the 
original malpractice act, namely, to keep down medical malpractice insurance rates in 
Utah so that health-care providers could obtain affordable insurance. (Br. of Aplee at 5.) 
2 
This court has already rejected the argument that a medical malpractice insurance 
crisis existed that justified the legislature in limiting the rights of an injured minor to seek 
a full and fair remedy for his injuries. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583-89 (Utah 1993).2 
Dr. Drezga tries to distinguish Lee on the grounds that the information it reviewed 
was only what was before the legislature in 1976, when it first passed the malpractice act, 
and not what was before the legislature in 1986, when it passed the cap. (Br. of Aplee at 
29.) There are several problems with this argument. 
First, because the damage cap infringes on constitutional rights (including the right 
to a remedy, the right to the uniform operation of the law and the right to a jury trial, as 
discussed more fully below), the burden was not on the plaintiffs to show that the 
legislative history of the damage cap was inadequate to support the cap. Rather, the 
burden was on Dr. Drezga to show that the damage cap was "a reasonable, nonarbitrary 
means for lowering medical malpractice premiums in Utah." Lee, 867 P.2d at 592 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result, joined by Hall, C.J.). See also, e.g., id. at 591; 
Swayne v. L.D.S Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637,647 n.l (Utah 1990) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring & dissenting); Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 831 
P.2d 123, 128 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Although the damage cap has its own legislative 
history, Dr. Drezga relies primarily on the history of and purported justifications for the 
original malpractice act, enacted in 1976, to support the damage cap. (See Br. of Aplee at 
2 Lee struck down the malpractice act's statute of limitations as applied to 
minors, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4(2). 
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5,28Y Neither he nor the health-care amici have shown what the legislature considered 
in enacting the cap in 1986.4 Cf Magleby, supra note 3, at 252 (''the nwnerical analysis 
3 The only legislative history from the 1986 act that either Dr. Drezga or the 
amici cite is comments in the floor debates arguing that the cap would result in a 20% 
reduction in medical malpractice insurance rates, which were blamed for costing 
conswners an extra $45 a day for hospital stays. (Br. of Aplee at 8 n.8 (citing James E. 
Magleby, The Constitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice Damages Cap Under the 
Utah Constitution, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 251 (1995), an article that, incidentally, 
concluded that the damage cap would probably be found unconstitutional.) ''No report on 
these figures was ever published by a legislative committee." Magleby, supra, at 251 
n.183. The 20% figure was based on a New York study, see Remarks of Sen. Barlow, 
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21), and ''the medical and legal 
environments in New York differ substantially from those in Utah," Matthew K. 
Richards, Comment, The Utah Medical No-fault Proposal: A Problem-fraught Rejection 
of the Current Tort System, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 103, 116. In fact, the rates for the Utah 
Medical Insurance Association (UMIA), the largest malpractice insurer in Utah, 
increased 23.8% from the time the act took effect July 1, 1986, to 1994. (See Br. of 
Amici Curiae Intermountain Health Care, Inc., et al. [hereinafter "IHC Br."], addendum at 
15.) Moreover, the $45 a day figure was based on a Missouri survey that had nothing to 
do with Utah. See Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc 
#21). 
4 The health-care amici rely principally on the 1994 Tillinghast report that 
two of them (along with UMIA) commissioned. They have not shown that the legislature 
knew about, much less considered, the substance of the Tillinghast report when it enacted 
the damage cap in 1986, nor have they cited any authority for considering such post-hoc 
justifications in determining whether the legislature had a sufficient basis for enacting the 
cap. The Tillinghast report does not show that any increase in insurance premiums for 
Utah physicians was attributable to large jury awards in Utah malpractice cases or that a 
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages would significantly reduce premiums, and, 
indeed, it could not, since in 1986 there had never been an award of noneconomic 
damages in Utah even half the size of the cap. See Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, 
Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). In fact, other studies have shown that the alleged 
crisis of the mid 1980s was not primarily caused by jury verdicts. See infra note 34. 
Moreover, any suggestion in the Tillinghast report that the damage cap was effective in 
meeting its objective is dubious at best. As the Tillinghast report acknowledged, the 
damage cap applied only to claims occurring after its effective date (July 1, 1986), and it 
took over four years to resolve claims for more than $100,000. (See IHC Br. addendum at 
94.) Yet the fortunes of malpractice insurers in Utah began to improve almost 
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conducted in Lee is probably still valid, unless the state can produce new evidence of a 
sudden increase in malpractice cases and the size of their verdicts"). 
Second, in Lee this court relied in part on data from the 1980s, including 
information as recent as 1987, in rejecting the proposition that a medical malpractice 
crisis justified placing discriminatory limitations on the malpractice claims of minors. 
See 867 P.2d at 584, 587-89.5 That information included evidence that, from 1979 
through 1983, UMIA collected over $13 million in premiwns and earned $4.3 million in 
investments and had unpaid losses of about $8.3 million. 867 P .2d at 587 n.24.6 Based 
on such evidence, this court in Lee rejected the notion that there was a medical 
malpractice insurance crisis in Utah as late as 1983, just three years before the cap was 
enacted. See id. at 587 n.24 (citing UMIA Financial Statement for 1983; Best's Insurance 
immediately. (See, e.g., id. at 105-06.) For 1988, medical malpractice insurers in Utah 
collected $22.8 million in premiwns and incurred only $4.7 million in losses. UTAH 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO Gov. NORMAN H. BANGERTER: BUSINESS OF 1988, 
at 31 (addendum at 2). Not surprisingly, the insurance industry's recovery coincided with 
the nation's economic recovery as a whole. The Dow Jones Industrial average decreased 
in 1988 and then rose steadily for the next thirteen years, until the next alleged 
malpractice crisis in 2001. See, e.g., www.jamesbaker.comldataldjia.htm. 
5 Some of the data the court relied on, such as the Utah State Medical 
Association's Medical Care Cost Containment Proposals, cited at 867 P.2d at 587, was 
actually part of the legislative history for the 1986 damage cap. See Mins. of the Agric. & 
Health Study Connn., May 16, 1984, attachment. 
6 For 1985, the year before the damage cap was enacted, medical malpractice 
insurers in Utah wrote $12,021,561 in premiwns and paid losses of$10,366,172. UTAH 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H. BANGERTER ... : BUSINESS OF 1985, 
at 18 (addendum at 4). Thus, even at the height of the so-called crisis, malpractice 
insurers in Utah were still making money. 
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Reports for Property-Casualty Companies, 1983). Moreover, from the empirical 
evidence that was available in 1986, when the legislature enacted the cap, it was not at all 
clear that a damage cap would reduce premiums, especially enough to make any 
difference in health-care costs. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the 
Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 91. HEALTH 
POL., POL'y & L. 629, 629, 639-43 (1985). 
Third, the legislative history of the 1986 act suffers from the same defects this 
court found in the 1976 act. It does not show that there was any crisis in Utah--in terms 
of either malpractice verdicts or the unavailability of malpractice insurance--at the time 
the bill was passed. In fact, it shows just the opposite. 
Senator Haven Barlow, the bill's sponsor, admitted that there had never been any 
award in Utah for pain and suffering higher than $100,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, 
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). Senator Barlow also admitted that he 
was not aware of any Utah doctors who had stopped delivering babies because of the cost 
of malpractice insurance. Id. (audograph disc #21.) See also Remarks of Sen. Hillyard, 
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21) ("you admit here on the floor of the 
Senate that there is no problem with this right now"). Moreover, the number of medical 
malpractice cases filed in Utah had been cut in half the previous year. Remarks of Sen. 
Matheson, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21). Cf Lee, at 867 P.2d at 585 (rejecting the 
claim of a crisis in part because claims in Utah had been decreasing). Nevertheless, 
Senator Barlow thought that the bill was necessary, not so much to address a crisis in 
6 
Utah, but to send a message to insurers that Utah was doing something about medical 
malpractice insurance. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph 
disc #21). 
Although the Utah State Medical Association claimed that ''there have been a few 
substantial awards in this state,,,7 it acknowledged that "certain states have a much greater 
problem than Utah." Utah State Medical Association, Medical Care Cost Containment 
Proposals 17 (Mar. 1984).8 
The legislative committee considering the proposed legislation reviewed a 
memorandum from the state Insurance Commissioner that stated, "Medical malpractice 
7 Senator Barlow noted one jury verdict for $4.3 million in Utah County three 
years earlier. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). 
The verdict (actually for $4,775,000 in 1982) was for a newborn, who suffered severe 
brain damage during delivery resulting in spastic quadriplegia, and for his mother, who 
suffered a ruptured uterus, necessitating a hysterectomy. Their claimed future economic 
losses alone were $7 million. See Hunter v. Lewis, NR No. 17446, 1982 WL 244812. 
Senator Barlow also noted two recent settlements over $2 million each but acknowledged 
that both were for economic losses and would not have been affected by the damage cap. 
Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). 
8 Utah has traditionally had some of the lowest malpractice verdicts in the 
United States. See Magleby, supra note 3, at 252 (footnote omitted). In fact, for the 
period from September 1, 1990, through December 31,2000, Utah ranked 50th in the 
nation in median malpractice payments. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National 
Practitioner Data Bank 2000 Annual Report, table 9 (addendum at 7). The legislative 
committee considering the cap reviewed a paper commissioned by the Insurance 
Corporation of America that admitted that, "[a ]lthough concern about the malpractice 
crisis [of the 1970s] was nationwide, subsequent studies have indicated that a true crisis 
existed in only nine states," and Utah was not one of them. Karen Zellars & Jed 
Robinson, Limitations on Damages for Acts of Medical Malpractice: Are Ceilings 
Constitutional? (Jan. 1982) (attached to the committee's Sept. 21, 1983 minutes), at 2 & 
n.4. The authors noted that, of 13 states that had passed damage caps, 10 "apparently did 
not have a crisis at the time their statute was enacted." Id. at 2. 
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rates in Utah are still among the lowest in the country," and concluded that "medical 
malpractice rates in Utah are not excessive." Memo. from Roger C. Day to Members of 
the Agric. & Health Interim Study Comm., Aug. 16, 1983, at 2, attached to Mins. of 
Agric. & Health Study Comm., Sept. 21, 1983. The Commissioner also noted, 
"Additional companies are continually entering the market to provide medical 
malpractice coverage for Utah doctors. This will continue to improve the competitiveness 
of the Utah marketplace." Id. 9 
The legislative history also does not show that a $250,000 cap on noneconomic 
damages would likely make malpractice insurance more available in Utah. Senator 
Matheson related the experience of a Utah hospital that had its insurance canceled, not 
because any claims had been made against it but because of two lawsuits in California 
that caused its insurer to cancel all its policies. See Remarks of Sen. Matheson, Utah 
Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21). As one senator stated, "[Y]ou pass a law that 
limits a right to recovery for Utah citizens, but by the same token, our health-care 
providers are paying insurance based on a national standard, and we end up with no real 
influence on what happened here." Remarks of Sen. Hillyard, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 
(audograph disc #21). 
9 By the end of 1985, there were 42 insurers writing medical malpractice 
insurance in Utah. UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H. BANGERTER 
... : BUSINESS OF 1985, at 27 (addendum at 5). 
8 
To the extent that Utah insurance rates were based on Utah experience, the 
evidence did not show that the cap was necessary to keep malpractice rates low because 
there had never been a verdict in Utah for pain and suffering of $100,000, let alone 
$250,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). 
In passing the damage cap, the House acknowledged that the cause of the alleged 
insurance crisis was not malpractice awards but insurance companies setting their 
premiums too low to get an adequate return for their investors. See Remarks of Reps. 
Fox, Holt and Sykes, Utah House of Representatives, Feb. 12, 1986 (record #3). See alsl 
infra note 33. 
The same cost containment proposals that the Lee court cited to show that "the 
dominant causes of increased health-care costs were other than increased malpractice 
insurance premiums," 867 P.2d at 587, also admitted, "Setting the size of the limit [on 
noneconomic damages] is arbitrary." Utah State Medical Association, supra, at 17. 
In short, there is no evidence before the court that the legislature properly found 
either that a crisis existed in Utah or that a $250,000 damage cap--or any cap at all--was 
necessary to assure continued affordable malpractice insurance or health care in Utah. 10 
10 Moreover, there is evidence that damage caps do not in fact lower 
premiums, at least not significantly. See, e.g., Lee, 867 P.2d at 587 (notwithstanding tort 
reform legislation, "malpractice premiums have continued to rise, while the ratio of 
physicians' malpractice insurance costs to physicians' incomes nationally has not 
changed significantly") (citing Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 
1970s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,31 (1986». See also Statement 
of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy in Opp'n to the Med. Malpractice Amend., July 26,2002 
(addendum at 10-11); William P. Gronfein & Elenor DeArman Kinney, Controlling 
9 
But even if damage caps lower premiums, as Dr. Drezga and the amici claim, that 
does not mean that they are constitutional. Theoretically, one could stabilize insurance 
premiums by limiting medical malpractice damages to $1 or by immunizing doctors from 
all liability, yet such draconian steps would clearly be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989) (striking down a 
$100,000 cap on total damages against the University Hospital); Masich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612,624 ("If the legislature 
were to abolish all compensation and all common law rights for negligence ... , no 
contention could reasonably be made that it was a proper exercise of the police power"), 
Large Malpractice Claims: The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps, 161. HEALTH 
POL., POL'y & L. 441, 458 (1991). In fact, in California, which has had a $250,000 cap 
on noneconomic damages since 1975, the mean medical malpractice premium for self-
employed physicians in 1998 was 19% higher than the national average and the median 
was the same. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC 
STATISTICS, 2000-2002 EDITION 67 (John D. Wassenaar & Sara L. Thran eds., 2001). In 
1994, California had the seventh highest insurance premiums in the nation for orthopedic 
surgeons. David Frum & Frank Wolfe, !fYou Gotta Get Sued, Get Sued in Utah, 
FORBES, Jan. 17, 1994, at 70, 72. Despite Utah's damage cap, premiums for Utah's 
largest malpractice insurer, UMIA, have increased 95.8% since the cap was enacted. (See 
IHC Br., addendum at 15.) The American Insurance Association (AlA), an insurance 
industry trade association, and tort reform advocates have denied promising that tort 
reform measures like the damage cap would reduce insurance rates. See AlA Press 
Release, Mar. 13,2002 ("Insurers never promised that tort reform would achieve specific 
savings") (addendum at 15); Michael Prince, Tort Reforms Don't Cut Liability Rates, 
Study Says, BUSINESS INS., July 19, 1999, at 73 (addendum at 17, 18). In Nevada, after 
successfully lobbying for a $350,000 damage cap, one of the largest insurers of Clark 
County OB/GYNs, said it had no plans to lower its premiums because "[m]eaningful tort 
reform was not expected to dramatically change the pricing of insurance premiums." See 
Joelle Babula, State Insurance Program Holds Off on Lowering Rates, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 14,2002 (addendum at 20). 
10 
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948). An arbitrary cap of $250,000 on noneconomic 
damages is no more constitutional. 
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "HARD" AND "SOFT" DAMAGES IS 
IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE. 
Dr. Drezga suggests that limitations on noneconomic (so-called general) damages 
are legitimate because such damages are "soft," as opposed to ''hard'' economic damages 
(e.g., Br. of Aplee at 30-32,35-36), meaning that the former are harder to calculate than 
the latter and hence more susceptible to abuse. That is not true in this case. The jury 
awarded $1,022,735.30 in economic damages ($22,735.30 in past special damages and 
$1,000,000 in future special damages) and $1,250,000 in noneconomic damages. (R. 
360.) Dr. Drezga never challenged either the amount of noneconomic damages nor the 
evidence to support them--not at trial, not in a post-trial motion, and not on appeal. If a 
party thinks a jury's award of damages is excessive or was influenced by passion or 
prejudice, the law provides ways to challenge the award. See, e.g., UTAH R. ClV. P. 50 & 
59. Dr. Drezga never availed himself of these remedies. Instead, he has "accede[d]" to 
the plaintiffs' statement of facts (Br. of Aplee at 2), which provides a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for the award of $ 1,250,000 in noneconomic damages. Where, as here, 
the jury has fixed the amount of damages and those amounts are unchallenged, both 
general (noneconomic) and special (economic) damages are equally "hard," or frrm. 
11 
Moreover, studies show that juries do not differ significantly from supposedly 
more rational, less emotional decisionmakers in assessing and evaluating noneconomic 
damages. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: 
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND 
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 221-35 (1995); Roselle L. Wissler et aI., 
Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and 
Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 812-13 (1999); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the 
American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 898 (1998); 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77CORNELLL.REv. 1124, 1141 (1992).11 
11 Studies have also contradicted the implicit assumption of Dr. Drezga's 
argument, namely, that juries are "anti-doctor" and are swayed by their emotions in 
giving unfair, "windfall" awards to undeserving patients. Any bias seems to run in the 
opposite direction. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort 
System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 398 (1999) (reporting 
the results of a study that "dramatically illustrate [ s] pro-defendant trends" in medical 
malpractice and other cases); Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical 
Malpractice Example, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199,236 (Autumn 1988) (studies 
show "there is little support for the contention that juries in malpractice cases are pro-
plaintiff and consistently inclined to award large sums of money to prevailing plaintiffs"). 
One study, for example, found that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases win at trial at a 
much higher rate before judges than before juries and that recoveries in bench trials are 
higher than recoveries injury trials. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra, at 1126, 1137-38, 
1177. The authors found "little support for the widespread perception that juries are 
biased or incompetent." Id. at 1126. See also Kenneth Jost, Still Warring Over Medical 
Malpractice: Timefor Something Better, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 68, 70 (citing two 
studies, one by Duke University School of Law researchers that found that juries ruled in 
favor of doctors in 13 of 17 cases insurers rated as tossups and in 6 of 11 cases they 
expected to lose, and a New Jersey study that showed that doctors won 76% of tried cases 
and that juries typically did not consider the severity of the patient's injury in deciding 
12 
Often, as in this case, noneconomic damages are more significant than economic 
damages, and a cap on the former denies the victim of malpractice the compensation he or 
she needs most: 
The importance of these nonpecuniary losses can be seen by asking 
yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent 
between an uninjured state and a severely injured state, such as paraplegia, 
blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as your income and wealth 
remained constant. Your answer reveals the depth of nonpecuniary 
components captured roughly under the rubric of pain and suffering. 
Income and wealth are only in service of those myriad activities that make 
up life and living. These activities are the primary elements of life; 
pecuniary elements are secondary. It turns reality on its head to give 
transcendence to the pecuniary.[12] 
Neal K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 
N.Y.V. L. REv. 23, 58 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
liability). See generally VIDMAR, supra page 12, at 161-82 (summarizing the research 
and concluding that, "[o]n balance, juries may have a slight bias in favor of doctors"). 
Studies also show that juries under-compensate, especially for serious losses. E.g., 
FRANKA. SLOANET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 198,206,223 (1993). 
Moreover, the large verdicts frequently cited are misleading because they do not 
reflect the vast majority of cases that settle for nothing or nominal amounts. See Jost, 
supra, at 71; A. Russell Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on 
Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 126, 126 (1985). Nor do they 
accurately reflect the size of verdicts even where plaintiffs recover. See William 
Glaberson, When the Verdict Is Just a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, § 4, at 6 
(addendum at 23) (the average size of a verdict in the New York area reported in 1989 in 
the New York Times was $20.5 million, whereas the actual average verdict was only $1.1 
million). Thus, policy makers "'can't reliably use their impressions from reading the 
press about issues like whether the court system is out of control,'" yet they do. Id. 
(quoting Oscar G. Chase, an NYU law professor who conducted the study of verdict sizes 
reported in the media). 
12 Not only that, but by allowing full recovery for economic damages while 
capping noneconomic damages, the statute assures full compensation to the medical 
insurance industry while denying it to the innocent victim of malpractice. 
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE ALSO IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE. 
Dr. Drezga also suggests that the victims of malpractice are not left without an 
adequate remedy because they can collect unlimited punitive damages. Punitive damages 
are a red herring, for several reasons. First, punitive damages are not meant to 
compensate the plaintiff for his or her injuries. They are a '"quasi-criminal''' remedy 
meant to punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (citations omitted). Second, 
punitive damages can only be awarded for egregious misconduct--''willful and malicious 
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
l(1)(a). Negligence--even gross negligence--is not enough. Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 
295, 117 P. 54, 57 (1911). As bad as Dr. Drezga's misconduct was, no one ever 
suggested he should be liable for punitive damages. (See R. 1-22.) Third, punitive 
damages have never been awarded for a medical malpractice case in Utah. See, e.g., 
Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). Fourth, half 
of all punitive damages over $20,000 do not go to the injured plaintiff but to the State of 
Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3)(a). Fifth, punitive damages cannot be insured 
against under Utah law. Id. § 31A-20-101(4). This may explain why the insurance lobby 
was willing to throw the victims of medical malpractice this hollow bone. 
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IV. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS DO NOT EVIDENCE A TREND TOWARD 
MORE DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Dr. Drezga also argues that there is a "discemable trend" in this court's decisions 
towards a more deferential, less skeptical approach to "tort-limiting legislation applicable 
to private parties or governments perfonning non-governmental functions." (See Br. of 
Apleeat 16-17.)13 The cases he cites do not support that proposition. 
In two of the cases, the court rejected constitutional challenges to the 
Governmental Immunity Act's damage cap. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, 53 
P.3d 473; Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,5 P.3d 616. However, both those cases involved 
governmental actors perfonning core governmental functions. See Parks, 2002 UT 55, ~ 
14; Lyon, 2000 UT 19, ~~ 42-43. This court has consistently held that damages arising 
out of the performance of a core governmental function may constitutionally be limited 
13 Dr. Drezga also suggests that there is a trend in the legislature to limit tort 
remedies. (See Br. of Aplee at 13-14 (citing various statutes).) If that is true, it is all the 
more reason the court should not defer to the legislative judgment. The judiciary is the 
only branch of government that is truly independent. The legislature is subject to intense 
political and special interest pressure. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 
625 (1954); Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler MIg. Co., 1999 UT 18, ~ 36,974 
P .2d 1194 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted); CHARLES LEWIS & CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE CONGRESS: How SPECIAL INTERESTS HA VB 
STOLEN YOUR RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 2-8, 41-45 
(1998). When the legislature is willing to sacrifice the rights of injured people--those 
most in need of protection and least able to protect themselves--to the interests of 
powerful corporations and industries, such as the medical and insurance industries, it is 
only the courts that stand between the people and tyranny. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 
at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996) (''the courts were designed to 
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority"). 
15 
because, but for the government's waiver of its sovereign immunity, there could be no 
liability, and the same act that creates liability can also limit it. See, e.g., McCorvey v. 
Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 868 P.2d 41,47-48 (Utah 1993).14 
By contrast, people injured by medical malpractice in Utah have always been able 
to sue their negligent health-care providers. 15 The malpractice act did not create a 
liability that otherwise would not have existed; instead, it limited remedies for an existing 
liability. 
In Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Company, 1999 UT 
18, 974 P.2d 1194, the court upheld the new builders statute of repose after having held 
the prior statute unconstitutional. However, the court did not defer to the legislature but 
exercised its constitutional role to review the reasonableness of the legislation under the 
test set out in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,680 (Utah 1985). See 1999 
UT 18, ~~ 15-23.16 
14 Similarly, in Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997), also 
cited by Dr. Drezga, the court held that Utah's Good Samaritan Act, which immunized 
doctors from liability under certain circumstances, did not violate the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution because, even without the act, the defendant had no 
duty to act and hence no liability. 
15 See, e.g., Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984); Nixdorfv. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199,436 P.2d 435 
(1968); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937); Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 
197 P. 1043 (1921); Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hosp. Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 
691 (1907). 
16 The court in Craftsman emphasized that the new statute was "substantially 
different" from the old one, 1999 UT 18, ~ 19, that the new statute added significant 
safeguards for injured persons, id. ~ 22, and that there was undisputed evidence that the 
16 
Finally, in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 VT 79, 453 Vtah Adv. Rep. 40, a majority 
of this court reaffmned Berry as stating the test to be applied in detennining the 
constitutionality of legislation that impinges on one's right to a remedy under article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See 2002 UT 79, ~~ 29,41-48, 72 (Durham, C.J., 
with Howe, 1., concurring) & 79 & 81 (Russon,1.).17 The court in Laney did not defer to 
the legislature'S judgment that all acts of municipalities (specifically, the operation of an 
electrical power system) are governmental functions but instead held the statute at issue 
there unconstitutional. See 2002 UT 79, ~~ 65-71.18 
new statute would cut off less than 1 % of valid claims, id. ~~ 21, 23. The damage cap at 
issue here does not provide any safeguards for those most seriously injured but, as in this 
case, deprives them of a substantial percentage of their actual damages. 
17 The amici can be excused for not citing Laney in their briefs because the 
decision came out after they filed their briefs. The health-care amici have submitted to 
the court as "supplemental authority" a new federal government report that is irrelevant to 
the issue of the 1986 damage cap, yet neither they nor the State has identified Laney as 
new, supplemental authority. One can only assume they have not done so because they 
thought that the court was well aware of the decision and of its relevance to this case and 
that Dr. Drezga had adequately covered it in his brief. 
18 The plaintiffs are at a loss to understand how the court's conclusion in 
Laney that the legislature had not specifically identified any "clear social or economic 
evil" and that ''the broad sweep of the [statute] is arbitrary and unreasonable" as applied, 
2002 UT 79, ~ 71, is "consistent with a de facto more deferential approach" to the 
legislative judgment, as Dr. Drezga claims (Br. of Aplee at 17). 
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v. THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE RIGHT-TO-A-REMEDY 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 11. 
A. Berry v. Beech Aircraft States the Test for Determining 
Constitutionality Under Article I, Section 11. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this court held that a 
statute that deprives an injured person of a remedy satisfies article I, section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution if it provides him with "an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
'by due course of law' for vindication of his constitutional rights." 717 P.2d at 680. Ifit 
does not, it "may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. (citations omitted). Dr. Drezga 
criticizes the Berry test but stops short of asking the court to overrule Berry. (See Br. of 
Aplee at 14-25.) The State of Utah, on the other hand, urges the court to abandon the 
Berry test, claiming it exalts the judicial branch over the legislative branch. (Br. of 
Amicus Curiae - State of Utah [hereinafter "State Br."] at 3_26.)19 
19 If the State's amicus brief sounds familiar, it is because it repeats, often 
verbatim, arguments the State has made--and this court has rejected--in other cases, 
including Parks, No. 991023-SC, 2002 UT 55, and Laney, No. 981729-SC, 2002 UT 79. 
However, the State has backtracked from the extreme position it took earlier, that article 
I, section 11 was meant only as a limit on the judiciary and not on the legislature. 
Instead, it now argues that the legislature should be able to alter the common law "so long 
as its enactments are not arbitrary or completely unreasonable." (State Br. at 14.) Thus, 
not even the State advocates the minority position Justices Wilkins and Durrant took in 
Laney, namely, that article I, section 11 only guarantees procedural rights (i.e., the right to 
go to court) and offers no substantive protection. See 2002 UT 79, ~ 132 (Wilkins, 1., 
concurring & dissenting). 
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The State's argument ignores precedent and rejects the most recent pronouncement 
of this court. In a "long line of cases," from Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & 
Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948), to the 
present, the nearly ''unanimous view of each and every justice of this Court who has ever 
ruled on the construction of Article I, section II--some thirteen justices in all" --has been 
''that Article I, section 11 imposer s] a substantive guarantee of a remedy by due course of 
law that the Legislature [can] not ignore without having a substantial, nonarbitrary basis 
for doing SO."20 Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 38 & 86 (Stewart, J., concurring).21 This 
court's construction of the open courts provision is consistent with the vast majority of 
decisions from other jurisdictions construing similar constitutional provisions. See 
Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~ 33 (of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that have an open courts 
provision, "most courts 'interpret the remedy guarantee to proscribe [at least] some 
20 The only exceptions are Justices Zimmerman, Wilkins and Durrant. For 
nearly fifteen years, Justice Zimmerman agreed with the court's article I, section 11 
jurisprudence and, in fact, forcefully defended its philosophical underpinnings in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348,367-68 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in part). Shortly before he left the bench, he abruptly changed his position. 
See Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ,-r~ 108-55 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Justice Wilkins 
(joined by Justice Durrant) agreed with Justice Zimmerman's position in Laney, 2002 UT 
79, ~~ 85-139 (Wilkins, J., concurring & dissenting, joined by Durrant, Assoc. C.J.). 
21 Justices Russon and Durham agreed with the analysis of the open courts 
provision set out in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Craftsman. See Craftsman, 
1999 UT 19, ~ 15 n.5 & ~ 103. Thus, that opinion represented the view of the majority of 
the court. See also Day v. State ex rei. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, ~ 37 n.9, 
980 P .2d 1171. 
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legislation affecting remedies .... "') (quoting David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 
65 TEMP. L. REv. 1197, 1208 (1992».22 
Despite the State's repeated efforts to overthrow Berry, it remains the law of this 
state. The Berry test has been applied in numerous cases over the last seventeen years,23 
and the court recently reaffmned its place in its article I, section 11 jurisprudence. See 
Laney, 2002 UT 79, ~ 47 (Durham, J., with Howe, J., concurring) & ~~ 79 & 81 (Russon, 
1., concurring). 
Dr. Drezga cites Laney primarily for its dissent, but the position of the dissenters 
has never carried a majority of this court. If the rule of stare decisis and "principles of 
institutional integrity," see Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-
22 Even those courts that the State claims review legislative enactments more 
deferentially under an open courts provision recognize that there are limits to what the 
legislature may do: "Certainly, the legislature may not declare to be right that which is 
essentially wrong, nor say that which is a definite, substantial injury to fundamental 
rights to be no injury, nor abolish a remedy given by the common law to essential rights 
without affording another remedy substantially adequate." Gallegher v. Davis, 183 A. 
620,624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Wagner v. Chanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963). 
23 See, e.g., Laney, 2002 UT 79, ~~ 49-71 (per Durham, J.) & 82 (Russon, J., 
concurring); Day, 1999 UT 46, ~~ 40-48, 980 P .2d 1171; Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 15-
23, 974 P.2d 1194; Hirpa, 948 P.2d 785, 792-94; Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162-
66 (Utah 1996); Lee, 867 P.2d 572,581 (majority opinion) & 590-92 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091-96 (Utah 1989); Sun 
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 191-93 (Utah 
1989); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-61 (per Durham, 1.) & 366-69 (Zimmerman, 1., 
concurring in part); Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 559-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362, 1365-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 870 
P.2d 957 (Utah 1994); Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125-
30 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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46 (1992), are to mean anything, the court should reject any argument to abandon the 
Berry test. If a court were to abandon established precedents with each change in its 
composition, the public would soon lose faith in the judicial process. See State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289,292 (Utah 1995) (stare decisis "reinforces confidence in 
judicial integrity"). "[N]o judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue 
afresh in every case that raised it. . .. Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law 
underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for 
precedent is, by defmition, indispensable." Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854 
(citations omitted). Thus, "arguments which in their ultimate formulation" conclude that 
Berry should be overruled, as well as any "reservations" individual members of the court 
may have about reaffmning Berry, should be outweighed by "the force of stare decisis. " 
See id. at 853. 
B. Article I, Section 11 Does Not Constitutionalize the Common Law. 
The State of Utah persists in making an argument that this court has repeatedly 
rejected, namely, that this court's interpretation of article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution impennissibly constitutionalizes the common law.24 See, e.g., Day, 1999 UT 
24 The State also suggests that Utah historically rejected the common law. 
The early Mormon pioneers spurned the common law because it outlawed polygamy and 
because of their distrust of the non-Mormon judges the federal government sent to 
enforce it. See Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah 
Territory, 1850-61,21 DIALOGUE 97, 98 (1988). By the time Utah became a state in 
1896, the Mormon Church had abandoned polygamy, see DOCTRINE & COVENANTS 
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46, ~~ 35-37,980 P.2d 1171; Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 39 & 68-70,90-99 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,435-36 (Utah 1995); Horton, 785 P.2d at 
1090-91; Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988); Berry, 717 P.2d at 676 (citation 
omitted). See also Ross, 920 P.2d at 1169 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding 
the flatly erroneous assertions to the contrary by the Attorney General, ... this Court has 
made it abundantly clear that the guaranteed remedy provision of the open courts clause 
does not constitutionalize the common law") (citations omitted). 25 In determining what 
the framers intended by a "remedy by due course of law," the court can look to the legal 
Official Decl. I, and Utah had accepted the common law, see, e.g., Thomas v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., I Utah 232,234 (1875) ("Although the Common Law has not been adopted in 
this Territory by any Statute, we entertain no doubt that it should be regarded as 
prevailing here, so far as it is not incompatible with our situation and government, and 
that it is to be resorted to as furnishing ... the measure of personal rights and the rule of 
judicial decision"); First Nat 'I Bank of Utah v. Kinner, I Utah 100, 107 (1873) (the 
people of Utah have ''tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the Common Law 
suited to their conditions and consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States"). The first code of the new state expressly adopted the common law of England 
"so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict with," Utah or federal law. REv. STAT. OF 
UTAH § 2488 (1898), now codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1. Whatever the early 
Mormon pioneers thought of the common law in the 1850s, by 1896, when the Utah 
Constitution was adopted, the historical antipathy toward the common law had softened, 
and public distrust had shifted away from the courts and toward legislatures, with their 
ties to big business and powerful corporations. See, e.g., Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 50-
54 (Stewart, J., concurring), and authorities cited therein. 
25 Although this court has denied that article I, section 11 constitutionalizes 
the common law, the history of the origins of right-to-remedy provisions in this country 
suggests that they were in fact meant to prevent legislatures from overriding common-law 
rights. See Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary "Right to a Remedy, "TRIAL, Mar. 1998, 
at 48, 52. "In the fmal analysis, the issue is not ... a legislature'S abstract 'right to alter 
the common law.' This power, of course, exists, but only so long as legislative' change [ s] 
doD not interfere with constitutional rights. ,,, Id. at 52 (footnote omitted). 
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rights and remedies that existed when the constitution was adopted, but that is just the 
beginning of the court's analysis, not the end. See Lyon, 2000 UT 19, ~ 35, 5 P.3d 616 
(Stewart, 1., concurring) (citing DeBry, 889 P.2d 428). 
The wrong that article I, section 11 was meant to address was the abolition of 
remedies to redress injuries done to a person "in his person, property or reputation." The 
threat to a remedy may come from any of the three branches of government--the 
legislative, executive or judicial branch. There is nothing in the text or history of article I, 
section 11 to show that the framers intended it to apply to only one branch and not the 
others.26 Constitutional limitations "are not peculiar to anyone branch of the 
government" but apply to each department; ''they are imposed as a security to the rights 
of the principal,-the people." Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 P. 670, 675 (1896) 
(Bartch, 1., concurring).27 A construction of article I, section 11 that did not limit the 
legislature'S ability to alter or abolish established remedies would do "violence to logic as 
well as tradition." JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2(c), at 352 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
26 At the time Utah adopted article I, section 11, such a provision was "in 
nearly every constitution and declaration of rights in the country. It [was] a provision that 
has come to us with the approval of the ages." 1 OFFICIAL REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ... TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF 
UTAH 304 (1898). At that time, the evil the remedy guarantee was meant to redress ''was 
renegade legislatures." See Schuman, supra page 20, at 1201. 
27 Justice Miner joined Justice Bartch's concurring opinion in Ritchie, making 
it the opinion of the three-member court. See 47 P. at 681 (Miner, J., concurring). 
23 
The State quotes dicta from one early Utah case to the effect that article I, section 
11 "applies only to judicial questions. It is not meant thereby that this court may reach 
out and usurp powers which belong to another independent and co-ordinate branch of the 
state government." (State Br. at 7 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556, 563 (1918)).) Although the court did not defme what it meant 
by 'judicial question," determining whether a statute violates an express constitutional 
provision has always been a 'judicial question."28 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 
Ill, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803) ("if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the 
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that 
case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformable to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting 
rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty"). 
c. The Court's Interpretation of Article I, Section 11 Does Not Violate the 
Separation of Powers. 
The State argues that this court's interpretation of article I, section 11 violates the 
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, article V, section 1. 
28 The issue in Utah Light was whether the legislature could properly limit 
judicial review of an order of the Public Utilities Commission approving a rate increase. 
Although the statute in question provided that the commission's fmdings and conclusions 
on questions of fact "'shall be fmal and shall not be subject to review,'" see 173 P. at 558, 
the court nevertheless reviewed the commission's fmdings to determine whether there 
was substantial evidence to support them. See id. at 563. Thus, even in the case the State 
relies on, the court did not simply defer to the legislature'S judgment. 
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Alexander Hamilton refuted such an argument long ago: 
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce 
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from 
an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary 
to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the 
acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may 
be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the 
American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests 
cannot be unacceptable .... 
. . . The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province 
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, 
as a fundamental law . It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, 
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative 
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the 
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to 
be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to 
the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. 
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the 
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the 
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, 
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in 
the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than 
the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, 
rather than by those which are not fundamental. ... 
. . . [A]ccordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the 
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the 
latter and disregard the former. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 400-01 (Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996). 
The State's argument proceeds from a false premise, namely, that the court has 
somehow exalted the common law over legislation. The court's interpretation of article I, 
section 11 does not constitutionalize the common law. See supra pt. V.B. Instead, it 
gives meaning to the constitution's guarantee of a "remedy by due course of law" for an 
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injury done to one's "person, property or reputation." Exalting either legislation or the 
common law "over a clear constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional 
government." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,634 (Utah 1990). Under 
the separation of powers doctrine, the court is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality 
oflegislation. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at Ill, 1 Cranch at 177-78. In 
exercising its constitutional power to review legislation that is claimed to violate the 
constitution, the court is not acting as ''the critic of the legislature, but rather, the guardian 
of the Constitution." Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251,256 
(Kan. 1988) (citation omitted), disapproved of on other grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P .2d 
1176, 1191 (Kan. 1991). By enforcing constitutional guarantees, the court does not 
violate the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, nor does it 
impermissibly "trench upon the domain of the legislative department." Ritchie, 47 P. at 
676 (Bartch, 1., concurring). "The power to declare what is the law is delegated to the 
judicial department, and therefore the courts have the unquestioned right to declare any 
act of the government, in any of the departments, which violates the constitution, to be 
utterly void." Id. at 675-76. 
The State's position, on the other hand, ''would virtually write article I, section 11 
out of the Utah Constitution," Laney, 2002 UT 79, ~ 29 (Durham, C.J.), ''would deny 
citizens of this state the constitutional right secured by the Framers to a remedy by due 
course of law for an injury to their persons, property, or reputations" and would frustrate 
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''the Framers' very purpose and intent in adopting the remedy clause in the Utah 
Declaration of Rights," Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~ 32 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
[T]he basic purpose of Article I, section 11 is to impose some limitation on 
[the legislature'S power to create new, and abrogate old, rules oflaw] for 
the benefit of those persons who are injured in their persons, property, or 
reputations since they are generally isolated in society, belong to no 
identifiable group, and rarely are able to rally the political process to their 
aid. 
Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 191 (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 676). 
D. The Damage Cap Fails the Berry Test. 
Dr. Drezga reluctantly recognizes Berry as stating the test for determining whether 
a statute violates article I, section 11, but urges the court to adopt a "classwide, deferential 
analytical approach" to Berry because the legislature is in the best position to balance 
detriments and benefits to the class affected by the legislation and can expand or contract 
tort rights "for larger public purposes." (Br. of Aplee at 25.)29 However, the legislature is 
29 Dr. Drezga cites Masich, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), for the 
proposition that the court should consider the impact of the legislation on the class 
affected by the act and that the class affected by the act is the public at large. Masich did 
not consider the effect of the statute involved there (the Occupational Disease Act) on the 
public at large but on those directly affected by the legislation--the class of affected 
workers. See 191 P.2d at 624. The public is always affected, however indirectly, by any 
legislation. The damage cap does not directly affect the public at large but only those 
victims of medical malpractice. The statute involved in Masich provided benefits to the 
affected class, by doing away with the employer's common-law defenses of contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant doctrine. See id. The damage cap 
and the medical malpractice act as a whole provide no benefits to the victinlS of medical 
malpractice but only deprive them of benefits they previously enjoyed. In any event, this 
court has rejected the argument that Berry is inconsistent with Masich. See Laney, 2002 
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also in the best position to be influenced by special interests and to sacrifice the rights of 
the defenseless to the interests of the powerful and the influential. See supra note 13. 
The purpose of a constitution, and particularly of a bill or declaration of rights, is to 
protect certain rights of minorities from infringement by the majority. As Justice 
Zimmerman recognized: 
[T]he very act of drafting a constitution such as ours, which does not 
bestow unlimited power on the legislature and which does reserve certain 
rights to the people, constitutes a recognition that there must be some limits 
on the legislature, that some interests of the people deserve special 
protection in the maelstrom of interest group politics that is the legislative 
process. Among the interests to which the Utah Constitution's drafters 
assigned a degree of sanctity are those mentioned in article I, section 11. 
To accord these rights the respect the drafters intended requires that 
we approach challenges to legislation alleged to infringe article I, section 11 
differently than we otherwise view claims of unconstitutionality that are 
directed at ordinary economic legislation. . .. [I]n weighing the proffers of 
the legislation's defenders, we should not use as our analytical model the 
permissive and perfunctory standard of reasonable relation. . .. Instead, we 
should give the legislation and its justifications careful scrutiny to assure 
that redress of legally cognizable injuries is not unreasonably impaired. 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Where, as 
here, the legislature decides to confer a benefit on the rich and powerful insurance 
industry at the expense of brain-injured children, something more than deferential review 
is required. See Berry, 717 P.2d at 678-69 (the court is "not at liberty to eviscerate a 
UT 79, ~ 43 (Durham, C.J.); Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 64, 83-90 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). Moreover, even if it were inconsistent (and it is not), Berry and Laney, as 
the court's more recent pronouncements on the subject, should control over Masich, a 
decision over haIfa century old. See, e.g., Purtell v. Tehan, 139 N.W.2d 655,658 (Wis. 
1966). 
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mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights" by resorting merely to legislative 
prerogative; that kind of analysis ''would result in the legislative power prevailing in 
every case, and would deprive the constitutional rights embraced in the remedies clause 
of any meaningful content or force"). 
1. Neither the Cap nor the Malpractice Act as a Whole Provides 
Any Alternative Remedy. 
Dr. Drezga claims that the damage cap passes the fIrst prong of the Berry test 
because the malpractice act as a whole provides an injured person "an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy." Dr. Drezga has not pointed to any provision of the act 
that provides any alternative remedy to injured patients or to the public generally. The 
act, as a whole, only restricts or eliminates remedies; it doesn't provide alternative 
remedies. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-14-4 (shortening the statute oflimitations), 
78-14-4.5 (reducing damages for amounts paid by collateral sources), 78-14-6 (requiring 
a writing for any claim for breach of warranty, guarantee or contract), 78-14-7.1 (limiting 
noneconomic damages), 78-14-8 & -12 to -14 (imposing procedural hurdles to bringing 
an action), 78-14-9.5 (limiting awards of future damages). Only some kind of Orwellian 
"newspeak" could fInd an effective and reasonable alternative remedy in a statute that 
only limits or does away with existing rights and remedies. 
The only provision of the act Dr. Drezga cites that is arguably of benefIt to the 
public is section 78-14-9, which authorizes the insurance commissioner to provide for 
professional liability insurance coverage through a joint underwriting program where 
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such coverage is not "readily available in the voluntary market." To the plaintiffs 
knowledge, the insurance commissioner has never had to invoke section 78-14-9 and has 
never even held hearings to determine whether malpractice insurance is not readily 
available in any area of this state. In any event, this provision had existed for a decade 
before the legislature eliminated an injured person's right to a remedy in excess of 
$250,000 in noneconomic damages. When the legislature passed the damage cap, it only 
eliminated a remedy--it did not provide an alternative remedy, much less an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy. 
Dr. Drezga argues, however, that by continuing to make affordable, insured health 
care available, the malpractice act satisfies Berry's first prong. But the act does not 
require any doctor to carry any insurance, let alone sufficient insurance to guarantee a 
recovery within the damage cap. Utah has always had affordable, insured health care, 
both before and after passage of the act and passage of the cap. 
[W]hen the legislature removes a particular right or remedy, it cannot 
simply rely on other preexisting rights or remedies to fill the void left 
behind, but must rather provide a quid pro quo in the form of either a 
substitute remedy for the individual or the removal of a perceived social or 
economic evil for society. 
Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 192 (second italics added). The malpractice act and its damage 
cap provide no quid pro quo or substitute remedy for Athan Montgomery. The right to 
sue his doctor (who mayor may not have insurance) was a preexisting right. 
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Moreover, "access to a source of recovery is vastly different from the right to a 
remedy." Kansas Malpractice Victims, 757 P.2d at 263.30 
"[T]o provide a remedy is not to guarantee a right, or indemnify against 
wrong. Obviously, the extent of the assets of a judgment debtor are not 
guaranteed by any Constitution. This argument evades the issue." ... 
[T]he legislature cannot abolish the right to a remedy by capping a 
plaintiffs recovery at $250,000, $1,000,000, or even $3,000,000 without 
providing an adequate substitute remedy. The "substitute" they propose 
here is nothing new in the law. [The damage cap] removes a substantial 
right of the plaintiff and gives him nothing in return. 
Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted).31 The same is true of the damage cap in this case. 
2. There Was No Clear Social or Economic Evil to Be Eliminated. 
Dr. Drezga argues that, even if the act fails the fIrst prong of the Berry test the cap 
still meets the Berry test because it eliminates a clear social and economic evil in a 
reasonable manner by keeping the cost of medical malpractice insurance within the reach 
of more doctors. To support this argument, the health-care amici inundate the court with 
information medical malpractice insurance crisis. The 
vast majority of the material (some 80%) deals with conditions in other states--not in 
", The court in Kansas Malpractice Victims held that Kansas's caps of 
$1,000,000 for total damages and $250,000 for noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice cases violated a malpractice victim's constitutional right to a remedy under 
the Kansas Constitution. 757 P.2d at 264. 
31 The court further noted that the continued availability of affordable health 
care is a questionable benefIt to malpractice victims because, but for the malpractice they 
might not need the continuing health care. 757 P.2d at 263. 
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Utah--and with current conditions, not conditions in 1986.32 Of the over 250 pages of 
materials the amici have submitted, none was before the legislature in 1986 when it 
passed the cap; it all post-dates the cap. 
The burden was on Dr. Drezga to show that the alleged medical malpractice 
insurance crisis of the mid 1980s was a "clear social or economic evil, " Berry, 717 P.2d 
at 680 (emphasis added), and he has not shown either that it was clear or that it was an 
evil. A problem is not necessarily the same as an "evil," and to proclaim it is not to make 
it "clear." At best, the evidence shows that doctors had to pay more for liability insurance 
in 1986 than they had previously paid. However, a problem for one sector of the 
economy is not the same as a clear social or economic evil, particularly where the 
problem is largely of the industry's own making.33 Cf Rob M. Alston, Comment, Utah's 
32 For critiques of the most recent wave oftort reform propaganda, see, e.g., 
Daniel J. Capra, 'An Accident and a Dream ': Problems with the Latest Attack on the 
Civil Justice System, 20 PACE L. REv. 339 (2000); Merritt & Barry, supra note 11; 
Statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy in Opp'n to the Med. Malpractice Amend., July 
26,2002 (addendum at 8-14); Testimony of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer 
Fed'n of Am., Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, July 17,2002 (addendum at 24-38). 
33 As this court recognized in Lee, "a significant cause of dramatically 
increased malpractice insurance premiums [is] the cyclical pricing and investment 
practices of insurance companies." 867 P.2d at 588. When the economy is good, 
insurance companies set artificially low rates to attract business so that the premiums can 
be invested for high returns. When the economy turns sour, premiums are insufficient to 
cover losses, and insurers raise their premiums dramatically. See id. at 588-89 (citation 
omitted). See also, e.g., Capra, supra note 32, at 376 ("the evidence now indicates that 
the insurance crisis [of the 1980s] was caused not by lawsuits, but rather by a cyclical 
downturn combined with questionable underwriting practices and a drop in interest 
rates"); Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 
42 STAN. L. REv. 539, 567-68 (1990) (book review) ("The insurance industry did 
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Statute of Limitations Barring Minors from Bringing Medical Malpractice Actions: 
Riding Roughshod over the Rights of Minors? 1992 UTAH L. REv. 929, 967 (it is ironic 
that ''the growing number of persons willing to bring claims mJ const! Iy 
right--should be viewed as an evil to be eliminated"). 
The primary cause of the alleged medical malpractice crisis is medical 
malpractice.34 E.g., Alston, supra, at 967 (footnote omitted). If there is an eviL it is "the 
experience a profit crunch during the years 1981-1983 but, as industry studies themselves 
acknowledge, this crunch was not the result of expanded tort liability") (citing NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS AND INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 1985: A 
CRITICAL YEAR 30 (1985)); Eliot M. Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering 
the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 
411-12 (1988) (accord). The same is true of the current crisis. See, e.g., Rachel 
Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice 
'Crisis, ' WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al (see addendum at 39-43); Todd Sloane, Back 
on the Tort Reform Merry-Go-Round, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 15,2002 (addendum 
at 44); Testimony of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Fed'n of Am., Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 17,2002 
(addendum at 25-31). In fact, the insurance cycle affects all insurance markets. See, e.g., 
Remarks of Sen. Finlinson, Utah Senate, Jan. 24, 1986 (audograph disc #23) (the 
availability of liability insurance is an industry-wide problem); Christopher Oster, 
Workers' Comp Insurers Shy from Business in Big Cities, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 22, 
2002 (premiums in nearly all insurance lines have increased by an average 10 to 50 
percent). For 1985, the year before the damage cap was passed, the loss ratio for medical 
malpractice insurance in Utah (86) was only slightly higher than the loss ratio for all lines 
of insurance in Utah (75). UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H. 
BANGERTER ... : BUSINESS OF 1985, at 18 (addendum at 4). Significantly, it is only the 
malpractice insurance industry that has secured special treatment from the legislature. 
34 Studies show that about 1 % of hospital patients are injured by negligent 
medical care each year. See, e.g., Eric 1. Thomas et aI., Incidence and Types of Adverse 
Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 264-65 (2000); 
PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL IN.nJRY, MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 43 (1993). See also PATRICIA M. DANZON, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1985) (based on a 
California study of hospital records, an estimated 260,000 injuries nationwide occur each 
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large number of malpractice victims that receive no compensation under the current tort 
system." Id. at 966.35 That is because the number of patients injured by medical 
malpractice greatly exceeds the number who ever file a claim.36 As one expert concluded: 
The visible costs of the malpractice system--insurance premiums, 
defensive practices--are small compared with the less visible but far larger 
costs of malpractice--the injuries that occur because of medical negligence. 
year as a result of negligent health care). A Harvard study estimated that over 150,000 
people die each year from medical malpractice. WEILER, supra, at 55. "Medical injury, 
then, accounts for more deaths than all other types of accidents combined, and dwarfs the 
mortality rates associated with motor vehicle accidents (50,000 deaths per year) and 
occupation-related mishaps (6,000 deaths per year)." Id. (footnote omitted). Based on a 
study of patients discharged from Utah and Colorado hospitals, one team of researchers 
recently concluded that health-care caused injury "continues to be a significant public 
health problem." Thomas, supra, at 61. 
35 Cf Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979, 991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) ("If anything is to 
be considered 'socially unacceptable' it would be for an individual [wrongfully] injured 
by another to receive less for pain and suffering than that amount to which he is 
entitled"). 
36 Less than one victim of malpractice in seven ever asserts a claim. WEILER, 
supra note 34, at 70. See also David M. Studdert et aI., Negligent Care and Malpractice 
Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000) (in a study of 
Utah and Colorado patients who suffered negligent injury, 97% did not sue); A. Russell 
Localio et aI., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to 
Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 250 (1991) (concluding that "the civil-justice 
system only infrequently compensates injured patients"). A Utah Department of Health 
study determined that, from 1995 to 1999,4,248 patients at Utah hospitals had a 
"misadventure of surgical and medical care," meaning that the adverse event was the 
result of an error. Utah Department of Health, Adverse Events Related to Medical Care, 
Utah: 1995-99 iii (June 2001) (addendum at 48). Another study determined that the 
adverse effects of medical treatment accounted for 4.7% of all injury- and poisoning-
related emergency department visits in 1997, or over 26,000 visits. Norma Wagner, 
Medical Mistakes Make Life Busier for E.R., SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 21, 2000, at AI, A6 
(addendum at 50). Yet UMIA, the largest medical malpractice insurer in the state, only 
reported a total of 3,263 claims for the ten-year period 1991-2000. UMIA Newsletter, 1 st 
Quarter, 2001 (addendum at 51). 
34 
· .. A rough estimate of the cost of these injuries is $24 billion, or ten times 
the cost of malpractice insurance premiums. 
Patricia M. Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 28,30 
(Mary Ann Baily & Warren I. Cikins eds., 1985) (footnote omitted). 
)~ The Cap Is an Arbitrary and Unreasonable Means of Achieving 
Its Objective. 
Even if the insurance industry were cOIlsidered a clear 
social or economic evil, the damage cap is an arbitrary and unreasonable means of 
remedying the problem. It is as irrational as the legislature trying to reduce the effects of 
crime on society denying crime victims compensation their 0 uries. As tIm Cllurt 
stated in Sun Valley: "[W]e do not believe that abrogation of an individual's section 11 
constitutional right is a reasonable way to provide for an industry's peace of mind. We 
simply cannot justify a policy favoring [a defendant's] economic interest in avoiding 
liability over a plaintiffs economic interest in recovering damages." 782 P.2d at 193. 
Not only have Dr. Drezga and the amici failed to show that health care from 
insured providers was threatened or unavailable in Utah in 1986, when the legislature 
enacted the cap, but they have also failed to show that taking away the rights of victims is 
a reasonable means of solving the alleged problem. And in fact it is not, for at least two 
reasons. 
First the evidence shows that the entire cost of the malpractice legal system 
(plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, pre litigation proceedings, pretrial discovery and 
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proceedings, trial or settlement) is less than 1% of the total health-care dollar. See, e.g., 
Lee, 867 P.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted). Thus, even if the legislature did entirely 
away with a cause of action for medical malpractice, the cost of medical care would only 
be reduced by about 1 % at the most. 
Second, a reduction in the severity of malpractice claims in Utah has little effect 
on insurance premiums for Utah providers, since the cost of insurance in Utah is not 
driven primarily by what happens in Utah. Utah is a small market. The majority of Utah 
providers are insured by UMIA, and UMIA reinsures above certain limits.37 Because 
UMIA must necessarily reinsure with national companies, reinsurance costs are 
determined by national experience. Thus, whatever happens in Utah has little effect on 
malpractice premiums here. And because "it is highly unlikely that lower insurance rates 
are inextricably tied to the existence of' the damage cap, cf Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 193, 
the cap cannot meet the second prong of the Berry test. 
This court in Laney rejected the argument that a statute passed "in the 'hope that 
passage ... will make it easier or cheaper for a government entity to obtain liability 
insurance'" met the second prong of the Berry test. 2002 UT 79, ~ 66 (citation omitted). 
The court noted that, while ''that objective is worthy," the "general nature of the 
37 Reinsurance is "[i]nsurance of all or part of one insurer's risk by a second 
insurer, who accepts the risk in exchange for a percentage of the original premium." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (7th ed. 1999). In 1991 and 1992, for example, UMIA 
had two reinsurance treaties. One insured losses over $300,000 (plus an indexed amount) 
up to $1,000,000, and the other insured losses over $1,000,000. Utah Med. Ins. Ass 'n v. 
Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1106 (1998). 
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legislative fmdings do not show that large damage awards have been made against 
municipalities in connection with their operation of an electrical power system, or that 
such operation has been affected in any way by potential 0 , m 
case. Drezga and the amici not shown that large damage awards against 
physicians in Utah had adversely impacted either the availability of liability insurance or 
the availability of health care. In fact, when the legislature passed the damage cap. there 
never been an noneconomic damages in Utah of even $100,000, let alone 
$250,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). 
Because ''the dramatic increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums and 
the increased costs health care were ITH)l significant increases in malpractice 
lawsuits or claims in Utah, ... or by significant increases in the size of jury verdicts," the 
legislative means for solving the insurance problem by depriving injured patients of their 
right to full recovery "simply does not the legislative objecti\eo" Lee, 867 P.' ;Jt 
588. "It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the 
medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and 
therefore most in need compensation." Carson t' l\I(lUrer. 
1980). 
Whatever slight benefit damage caps have in increasing the affordability of 
liability insurance and even slighter benefit . the rapid rise in the cost 
care. are more than offset by the harm they cause to the catastrophically injured, like 
Athan Montgomery, and the harm they cause to society, by deflecting attention away 
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from the real cause of any alleged medical malpractice crisis. See, e.g., Randall R. 
Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 53, 63 (1998) ("On their face," damage caps "do little or nothing to improve 
deterrence, compensation, and fairness in the administration of justice") (footnote 
omitted). They do nothing to address the problem of "the large number of uncovered 
medical injuries." Id. Moreover, they are "counterproductive in tenus of public safety" 
since they provide health-care providers ''with less incentive to take adequate 
precautions." Sun Valley, 782 P .2d at 193. "[The] economic function [of liability for 
negligence] ... is to deter uneconomical accidents," which "is produced by compelling 
negligent injurers to make good the victim's losses." Id. n.46 (quoting R. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law § 6.12, at 143 (1972)). See also Komesar, supra, at 59 ("Any 
determination of the desirable level of prevention that ignored nonpecuniary losses would 
grossly underestimate the desire for prevention"). 
In short, 
the legislation's supporters have not carried their burden of proof .... [T]he 
justifications advanced for the legislature's severe abridgement of the right 
of this narrow category of potential plaintiffs to bring their actions for 
actual injuries suffered are speculative, to put it charitably. The defenders 
of this legislation certainly have not shown that the effective elimination of 
the minor's legal right to sue for medical malpractice [or, as in this case, for 
noneconomic injuries greater than $250,000] is a reasonable, nonarbitrary 
means for lowering medical malpractice premiums in Utah. Absent such a 
showing, they have failed to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality 
that attaches to legislation that so severely limits a common law right of 
action protected by article I, section 11. 
Lee, 867 P.2d at 592 (Zimmerman, 1., concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.). 
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VI. THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE 
LAWS. 
As this court recently explained, article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the 
operation of ~lhe '''the same general princip]e 0" as the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
namely, that persons similarly situated should not be treated differently, but article I, 
section "'establishes different requirements the Protection Clause'" 
that are '''at least as exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard 
applied under the federal constitution. '" Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ,-r,-r 31, 33, 455 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citations omitted).38 A statute that "implicates a 'fundamental or 
critical right' or creates classifications which are 'considered impermissible or suspect in 
the abstract'" is analyzed under "a heightened degree of scrutiny." Gallivan, 2002 UT 
89, '140 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
The damage cap implicates fundamental or namely. the 
constitutional rights to a remedy and to a jury trial. It also creates impermissible or 
38 F or that reason, Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), which applied a federal equal-protection analysis to the 
Price-Anderson Act's $560 million damage cap on liability for nuclear accidents resulting 
from the operation of a federally-licensed private nuclear power plant, is not controlling 
on this point. Duke Power also did not involve a constitutional right to a remedy. The 
case is also distinguishable because the statute that capped damages also did away with 
defenses, allowing recovery without proof of fault; furthermore, the statute provided a 
fund for recovery, and Congress further agreed to ''take whatever action is deemed 
necessary ... to protect the public from the consequences of' a nuclear accident. See 438 
U.S. at 90-92. Here, the damage cap does not guarantee a malpractice victim any 
recovery. 
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suspect classifications, including classifications between the victims of medical 
malpractice and of other torts and between malpractice victims who suffer serious 
noneconomic injuries and those who do not. "[F]or a discriminatory classification to be 
constitutional it must be reasonably necessary to further, and in fact must actually and 
substantially further, a legitimate legislative purpose." Id. ~ 42 (citation omitted). 
Dr. Drezga argues that the damage cap does not violate article I, section 24 
because the classifications the cap makes are not discriminatory. He argues that there are 
legitimate differences between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims because 
of the ''high and unpredictable exposure to soft damages awards in the medical 
malpractice area." (Br. of Aplee at 35.) The distinction between so-called soft and hard 
damages does not apply in this case because all of Athan Montgomery's damages meet 
Dr. Drezga's defmition of "hard"; that is, their existence has been determined, and they 
have been measured. (See supra pt. II.) Moreover, there is no evidence that medical 
malpractice victims are exposed to greater "soft" damages than other tort victims. The 
amount of pain and suffering one suffers is determined by the nature of the person's 
injuries and his or her pain threshold and not by the identity of the tortfeasor.39 
Dr. Drezga also argues that the distinction between victims of medical malpractice 
and other tort victims is a straw man because everyone is a potential victim of medical 
39 If medical malpractice victims suffer greater noneconomic damages than 
other tort victims, that does not justify the discrimination against them but only makes it 
worse, by making it more likely that they will not be fully compensated for their injuries. 
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malpractice. But the statute does not cap the damages of potential victims because they 
have no damages to cap. It only caps the damages of actual victims of medical 
malpractice and not even all ofthem--only those who have actually suffered nonecollOlnic 
damages greater $250,000. 
By Dr. Drezga's reasoning, the court's most recent article I, section 24 decision 
was wrong. In Gallivan, the court concluded that the statute at issue there impermissibly 
a of registered voters--those who reside in urban counties. 
2002 UI 89, ~~ 44-49. Since every registered voter is potentially an urban resident, 
under Dr. Drezga's argument, the statute could not violate the uniform operation of the 
laws. 
By Dr. Drezga's reasoning, a statute that imposed restrictions on, say, Democrats 
but not Republicans would also raise no article I, section 24 concern because everyone 
could potentially' . Republican avoid the statute's restrictions. tact, 
such a statute, like the statute struck down in Gallivan, would raise less of an equal 
protection issue than the damage cap because people could avoid the restriction merely by 
choosing to change parties or moving from the to , \\hereas victims 
medical malpractice do not choose their status any more than one chooses his or her race 
or gender. 
Even if the class is all potential victims of medical malpractice, the cap still 
violates article I, section 24, since that section "protects against discrimination within a 
class," Gallivan, 2002 UI 89, ~ 38, and within the class of potential victims, only those 
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with noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 have their recoveries artificially 
limited. In short, even by Dr. Drezga's reasoning the statute does not operate uniformly 
on all persons similarly situated. See id. 
Dr. Drezga argues that the statute does not discriminate against the most severely 
injured because the plaintiffs have not shown a correlation between the severity of the 
injury and high noneconomic damages. Both courts and the insurance industry itself have 
historically considered the amount of the plaintiff s special damages as an indication of 
the value of his or her pain and suffering. See, e.g., Goertz v. Chicago & N. W Ry. Co., 
153 N.E.2d 486,494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958) (Kiley, J., concurring); H. LAURENCE Ross, 
SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 
239 (1970) ("The calculation of general damages is for the most part a matter of 
multiplying the medical bills by a tacitly but generally accepted arbitrary constant"). In 
any event, the plaintiff does not have to establish such a correlation empirically because, 
by definition, plaintiffs who suffer noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 are more 
severely injured (at least noneconomic ally) than those whose noneconomic damages are 
less than $250,000. 
Finally, for the reasons stated in point V.D, supra, the damage cap is not 
"reasonably necessary to further, and in fact [does not] actually and substantially further, 
a legitimate legislative purpose." See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ~ 42. 
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VII. THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
JURY TRIAL. 
Dr. Drezga claims that the plaintiffs' argument that the cap violates the 
constitutional right to a jury trial under article I, section lOis not only without support in 
but contrary to Utah law. (Br. of Aplee at 39-41.to McCorvey v. Utah State Department 
o/Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), and Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 
UT 55, the two cases Dr. Drezga cites for his argument, are distinguishable from this 
case.41 Both involved the Governmental Immunity Act cap as applied to governmental 
entities performing governmental functions. Because there was no right to recover for 
injuries arising out of such activities at common law, the statute that created a limited 
right to recover did not impinge on any fundamental right and did not violate the 
constitution because, in creating a right, the legislature can also put limits on it. See 
McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 47-48. 
40 Dr. Drezga overstates the plaintiffs' argument when he says that the 
plaintiffs appear to argue that the constitutional right to a jury trial is a right to have 
damages determined exclusively by the jury "without any oversight by a court, other than 
the possibility of a remittitur coupled with an opportunity for a new trial." (Br. of Aplee 
at 39.) In fact, the court exercises great control over the jury's determination of damages, 
by determining what evidence the jury hears and the instructions given to the jury, as well 
as by its power to review the jury's verdict. The jury's verdict is also subject to appellate 
review. The appellate court can reverse if the jury's damage award is not supported by 
the evidence or is excessive and influenced by passion or prejudice. These are all judicial 
functions that provide sufficient oversight to prevent the type of irrational and 
unsupported jury verdicts Dr. Drezga fears. See Vidmar, supra page 12, at 898 
(concluding that the judicial system's "corrective mechanisms for wayward jury verdicts" 
are effective in controlling the rare "outlier" award). 
41 Moreover, neither specifically analyzed article I, section 10. See Parks, 
2002 UT 55, ~ 18; McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 46-48. 
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Dr. Drezga acknowledges that "logic seems to require, that the right of the jury to 
detennine damages without interference ... is absolute." (Br. of Aplee at 39-40.) He 
argues, however, that the only Utah authority the plaintiffs cite--Justice Durham's 
separate opinion in Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 365-66--"does not take this logical absolutist 
approach." (Br. of Aplee at 40.) He ignores Justice Durham's clear statement: "I believe 
that the Utah state constitutional right to jury trial on the question of civil damages is 
absolute." 775 P.2d at 366.42 
Dr. Drezga also claims that, under Justice Durham's Condemarin analysis, the cap 
would be upheld because it is "significantly higher than" the cap in Condemarin, applies 
only to soft damages and is amply justified. In fact, when the $100,000 cap struck down 
in Condemarin was passed in 1965, it was relatively higher than the $250,000 medical 
malpractice cap when it was passed in 1986.43 As for Dr. Drezga's arguments regarding 
soft versus hard damages and justification for the cap, see points I, II and V.D, supra. 
Dr. Drezga and the health-care amici suggest that the cap does not violate the 
constitutional right to a jury trial because the jury's role is to detennine the facts, and it is 
42 Justice Durham went on to say that, "[u]nder the due process balancing 
approach," she ''would not hold any limitation in actions against the government was per 
se invalid because of the infringement of the right to jury trial," 775 P.2d at 366 (fust 
emphasis added), but she clearly believed that the damage cap in Condemarin violated the 
constitutional right to a jury trial, id. 
43 Based on the Consumer Price Index, $100,000 in 1965 dollars was worth 
$347,936.51 in 1986 dollars. 
44 
the legislature's role to determine the legal consequences of the jury's factual fmdings; a 
cap merely sets the outer limits of the remedy, which is a matter of law. 
Damages, however, are a question of fact, not law. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). Under Utah law, damages in 
medical malpractice cases--even damages for "mental and physical suffering" --are for the 
jury to decide: "While the law cannot measure with exactness such suffering and cannot 
determine with absolute certainty what damages, if any, plaintiff may be entitled to, still 
those are questions which a jury under proper instructions from the court must 
determine." Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307,64 P.2d 208,213 (1937) (emphasis added). 
See also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) ("if a 
party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of ... damages ... in order 
'to preserve "the substance of the common law right of trial by jury''''') (citation omitted). 
As this court has indicated "numerous times ... , the right of trial by jury is one which 
should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party ha[ s] demanded such a 
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit ofthejury'sfindings on issues offact . ... " Mel 
Hardman Prods., Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913,917 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
Dr. Drezga argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Cooper Industries supports 
his argument that the right to a jury trial is not violated when a court reduces a damage 
award to an amount the legislature has set. Cooper did not involve any statute and thus is 
inapplicable. Nevertheless, its reasoning supports the plaintiffs' position. The issue in 
Cooper was the standard of review an appellate court was to apply in considering the 
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constitutionality of a punitive damage award. 532 U.S. at 426. The Court held that de 
novo review was required. Id. at 436. In doing so, the Court distinguished between 
punitive and compensatory damages: '''Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, 
which presents a question of historical or predictive fact, the level of punitive damages is 
not really a "fact" "tried" by the jury.'" Id. at 437 (emphasis added and citations 
omitted). See also id. at 432 ("A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff s injury is 
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an 
expression of its moral condemnation"). Therefore, appellate review of a lower court's 
determination that an award of punitive damages is consistent with due process "does not 
implicate" the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. (footnote omitted). Altering a jury's 
award of compensatory damages, on the other hand, does impinge on a jury's factual 
fmding and hence on the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims 
Coalition v. Bell, 757 P .2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988) ("When the trial judge enters judgment 
for less than the jury verdict ... he clearly invades the province of the jury. This is an 
infringement on the jury's determination of the facts, and, thus, is an infringement on the 
right to ajury trial. '') (emphasis added).44 To argue that a statute that fIxes noneconomic 
damages without regard to the jury's factual determination does not infringe on the 
constitutional right to a jury trial is not only "illogical," 757 P.2d at 258, but also pure 
44 The trial court's power to order a remittitur does not violate the 
constitutional right to a jury trial because the plaintiff retains the option to have a second 
jury determine his or her damages. See infra note 45. 
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sophistry. The "constitutional protection cannot be evaded by the semantic argument" 
that the jury's factual fmding is not ignored but only limited. Cf Berry, 717 P.2d at 679. 
To argue that the right to a jury trial is not violated when the jury's factual detennination 
goes unheeded "pays lip service to the fonn of the jury but robs the institution of its 
function." Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,473 (Or. 1999) (quoting Sofie v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989». The court 
should "not construe constitutional rights in such a manner." fd. (quoting Sofie, 771 P.2d 
at 721). See also Berry, 717 P .2d at 678 ("We are simply not at liberty to eviscerate a 
mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights ... "). Otherwise, the legislature could 
fmd the facts in every case and deprive all of the jury's factual fmdings of their legal 
effect. 
Dr. Drezga's article I, section 10 argument is particularly ironic in light of his 
other arguments. He criticizes the unelected judiciary for what he sees as invading the 
province of the legislature, the people's representatives. Yet he is only too willing to 
allow the legislature to override a jury--''the purest democratic institution we have." 
David C. Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors Fried and 
Rosenberg, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 631,641 (2001). This is not a case of a court acting 
as a super-legislature but of the legislature overstepping its bounds and acting as a super-
jury. See Robert S. Peck, In Defense of Fundamental Principles: The Unconstitutionality 
of Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 672, 676 (2001). 
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VIII. THE PLAINTIFFS PRESERVED THEIR DUE PROCESS AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENTS. 
Dr. Drezga urges this court to disregard the plaintiffs' due process and separation 
of powers arguments because, he claims, they were not preserved below. As Dr. Drezga 
notes, to sufficiently preserve an issue for appeal, the trial court must have an opportunity 
to rule on the issue. The trial court has that opportunity if the issue is "specifically 
raised" in "a timely fashion," and the party introduces "supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844,847 (Utah 1998) 
(emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not brief their due process and separation of powers 
arguments in the trial court. However, there is no requirement that an issue be briefed to 
be preserved. At oral argument, the plaintiffs argued that the damage cap should be 
reviewed with heightened scrutiny because it violated due process (R. 810, at 20, 26, 45) 
and separation of powers (R. 810, at 43,45), among other things. At oral argument, 
plaintiffs' counsel also gave the trial court a copy of Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 
N .E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (see R. 810, at 21, 44), an Illinois case cited in the plaintiffs' 
memorandum (R. 472) that held that Illinois's cap on noneconomic damages violated the 
separation of powers doctrine. In ruling on the motion, the trial court indicated that it had 
considered both the briefs of the parties and the oral argument. (R. 785.) Thus, the 
plaintiffs specifically raised the due process and separation of powers issues in a timely 
fashion and supported them with relevant legal authority. 
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IX. THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
Dr. Drezga argues that, because there is no fundamental right to unlimited 
noneconomic damages, the court should defer to the legislature's conclusion that there is 
a rational basis for the damage cap and that the cap therefore does not violate the right to 
due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Regardless of whether there is a "fundamental" right to recover unlimited 
noneconomic damages, the right to recover for negligently caused personal injuries is "an 
'important substantive right,'" Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 354 (per Durham, J.) (quoting 
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980», and "a substantial property right, not 
only of monetary value but in many cases [such as this one] fundamental to the injured 
person's physical well-being and ability to continue to live a decent life," Hunter v. North 
Mason High Sch., 539 P.2d 845,848 (Wash. 1975). See also Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) ("Certainly, the right to the protection of the 
law for one's person [and] property ... is a right that is as essential to the happiness of an 
individual as is liberty"); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (per Stewart, 1.) ("Whether or not 
the right involved here is thought to be 'fundamental,' ... it is certainly an important 
right that ought not to be discriminatorily abrogated or diminished unless there is a strong 
countervailing public interest"). Moreover, the damage cap infringes on Athan 
Montgomery's constitutional right to a remedy under article I, section 11, his right to the 
uniform operation of the laws under article I, section 24, and his right to a jury trial under 
article I, section 10. All are certainly important, if not fundamental rights. Heightened 
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scrutiny is therefore required. Hipwell ex reI. Jensen v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988-89 nA 
(Utah 1993). 
Because Dr. Drezga has not shown that the damage cap was necessary for the 
continued availability of medical malpractice insurance in Utah, much less for the 
continued availability of insured health care, and because the cap can have only the 
slightest impact, if any, on the cost of health care in Utah, the damage cap is not 
"'narrowly tailored'" to achieve "a compelling state interest"; it therefore violates due 
process. See Wells v. Children's Aid Soc 'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted) (stating the test for due process where heightened scrutiny is required). 
x. THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS 
DOCTRINE. 
Dr. Drezga argues that the cap does not violate the separation of powers provision 
of the Utah Constitution, article V, section 1, because the legislature has the power to 
determine what the substantive law of Utah should be. 
The amount of damages, however, is a question of fact, not law. See, e.g., Cooper 
Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (2001). Juries determine the facts in a medical malpractice case, 
see, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307,64 P.2d 208,213 (1937), and juries are an arm of 
the judicial branch, not the legislative, e.g., Bell v. State, 381 P.2d 167, 173 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1962). A cap on damages contravenes the traditional authority of the judicial 
branch to assess, case by case, whether a damage award is excessive. See Best v. Taylor 
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Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1080 (Ill. 1997). It "directly changes the outcome ofa 
jury determination" by "taking a jury's fmding of fact and altering it to conform to a 
predetermined formula." Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720. It is a judge who is empowered to draw 
the legal conclusion that a jury award is excessive based on the evidence in the case. 
Because the legislature "cannot make such case-by-case determinations," the legislature'S 
attempt to do so violates the separation of powers. See id. at 721; Best, 689 N .E.2d at 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutions were created to protect and preserve certain critical rights of 
individuals in the face of changing political winds. See, e.g., West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 
1091 (Utah 1989). The courts "are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 
(Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996). "[I]t is not to be inferred ... that the 
representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a 
45 The judicial branch may order a remittitur of a jury verdict. See Best, 689 
N .E.2d at 1079 ("For over a century it has been a traditional and inherent power of the 
judicial branch of government to apply the doctrine of remittitur, in appropriate and 
limited circumstances, to correct excessive jury verdicts"). The legislature, however, may 
not. Sofie, 771 P .2d at 720-21. A judicial remittitur preserves the right to a jury trial 
because, if the plaintiff does not accept the remittitur, he is entitled to have his case heard 
by another jury. The damage cap does not preserve that right. See Lakin, 987 P.2d at 
472. 
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majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing 
constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions .... " 
Id. What Justice Moffat said in another time and context applies equally today: 
It is an easy method to avoid the plain terms of the State Constitution. If 
constitutional limitations may thus by a process of defmition be eliminated, 
evaded, or evaporated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing purposes and 
restraints of Constitutions intended to tide the people over periods of 
emergency, excitement, or trouble until calm reflection may analyze and 
measure the needs will cease to accomplish the purposes for which they are 
intended. Constitutions are drawn during sober hours, upon careful and 
painstaking consideration. It is beside the question to say the framers of the 
Constitution did not anticipate [an alleged medical malpractice insurance 
crisis, for example]. It is certain, however, that the framers of the 
Constitution and the people who adopted it intended that certain ... policies 
and limitations should be maintained. 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237,48 P.2d 530,553-54 (1935) (Moffat, 1., dissenting). 
The Utah Constitution guarantees injured persons a right to a remedy, the right to 
the uniform operation of the laws, the right to a jury trial and the right to due process. 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than 
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all 
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, 
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
nothing. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton). To allow the legislature to 
eliminate or evade these rights by defming them out of the constitution because of an 
alleged crisis that did not in fact exist in Utah violates both the spirit and the letter of the 
constitution. 
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Admittedly, "it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to 
do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution where legislative invasions of it had 
been instigated by the major voice of the community." Id. at 402-03. Nevertheless, for 
the foregomg reasons and those stated m the pJamtiffs' opening brief, the court should 
reverse the trial court's decision to limit the amount of the judgment, vacate the amended 
judgment and reinstate the original judgment. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2002. 
P, KJNG & OLSEN 
Paul M. Simmons 
(Original signature) 
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1988 SUMMARY OF UTAH OPERATIONS 






TOTAL LIFE INSURANCE: 
ANNUITIES: 
ACCIDENT & HEALTH: 
GROUP ACCIDENT & HEALTH 
CREDIT A & H. (GROUP & IND.) 
COLLECTIVELY RENEWABLE A " H 
NON-CANCELLABLE A " H 
GUARANTEED RENEWABLE A " H 
NON-RENEWABLE - STATED REASONS 
OTHER ACCIDENT ONLY 
ALL OTHER A " H 
TOTAL A " H: 





TOTAL FIRE " ALLIED LINES: 
MULTIPLE PERIL: 
FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 
HOMEOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 
COMMERCIAL MULTIPLE PERIL 
TOTAL MULTIPLE PERIL: 
AUTOMOBILE: 
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO NO FAULT 
OTHER PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO 
COMMERCIAL AUTO NO FAULT 
OTHER COMMERCIAL AUTO 
PRIVATE PASS. PHYSICAL DAMAGE 


















































































BURGLARY AND THEFT 
BOILER AND MACHINERY 
CREDIT 
TOTAL ALL OTHER LINES: 
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BUSINESS OF 1985 
TABLE C 
1985 SUMMARY OF UTAH OPERATIONS 
OF ALL INSURERS BY LINE OF INSURANCE 





TOTAL LIFE INSURANCE: 
ANNUITIES: 
ACCIDENT & HEALTH: 
GROUP ACCIDENT & HEALTH 
CREDIT A & H, (GROUP & IND.) 
COLLECTIVELY RENEWABLE A & H 
NON-CANCELLABLE A & H 
GUARANTEED RENEWABLE A & H 
NON-RENEWABLE - STATED REASONS 
OTHER ACCIDENT ONLY 
ALL OTHER A & H 
TOTAL A & H: 





TOTAL FIRE & ALLIED LINES: 
HULTIPLE PERIL: 
FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 
HOMEOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 
COMMERCIAL MULTIPLE PERIL 
TOTAL MULT~PLE PERIL: 
AUTOK>BILE: 
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO NOFAULT 
OTHER PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO 
COMMERCIAL AUTO NOFAULT 
OTHER COMMERCIAL AUTO 
PRIVATE PASS. PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COMM. AUTO PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
TOTAL AUTOMOBILE: 
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••• REP 0 R T TOT A L ••• 1,417 ,970,253 1.072.480.184 75 
18 
H E 0 I CAL HAL P RAe T ICE 
% OF PREMIUMS 
RANK NAME OF INSURER MARKET WRITTEN 
1 UTAH MEDICAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION 56.17 $ 6.327.289 
2 INSURANCE CORPORATION OF AMERICA 12.75 1.437.168 
3 ST PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS CO 8.17 920.639 
4 AMERICAN CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 6.56 739.056 
5 AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO THE 5.71 643.931 
6 PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE 1.65 186.867 
7 CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO 1.36 153.384 
8 CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY 1.30 146.807 
9 FREMONT INDEMNITY COMPANY 1.25 141.882 
10 ST PAUL MERCURY INS CO. THE 1.21 137.045 
11 PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO .72 82.164 
12 NATIONAL CHIROPRACTIC MUTUAL INSRANCE CO .69 78,315 
13 AMERICAN CASUALTY CO OF READING PA .44 49.866 
14 NATIONAL FIRE INS CO OF HARTFORD .22 25,132 
15 RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY .20 23.075 
16 JEFFERSON INSURANCE CO OF N Y .19 21.494 
17 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE .18 20,480 
18 INSURANCE CO OF THE STATE OF PENN .16 19.146 
19 NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INS CO .16 18,824 
20 INSURANCE CO OF NORTH AMERICA .12 14,205 
TOTAL FOR TOP 20 RANKED INSURERS 99.31 $ , 1,186,769 
TOT AL FOR ALL 42 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE 100.00 $ 11,263,510 
W 0 R K E R S C 0 H PEN SAT I 0 H 
% OF PREMIUMS 
RANK NAME OF INSURER MARKET WRITTEN 
INSURANCE CO OF NORTH AMERICA 12.56 $ 5,859.093 
2 WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY 9.27 4.324,007 
3 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO 6.89 3,213.197 
4 LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS CO 4.89 2,281.343 
5 EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU A MUTUAL CO 4.14 1.932,721 
6 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS CO OF PITTS 3.97 1.854,854 
7 ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 3.89 1 ,814,841 
8 BIRMINGHAM FIRE INS CO OF PA 3.35 1,563,925 
9 STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO THE 2.95 1,377 .821 
10 TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CO 2.90 1.352.338 
11 AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE CO 2.77 1.291.600 
12 PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO 2.36 1.100,547 
13 ARGONAUT INSURANCE CO 2.35 1,097.495 
14 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE 2.12 992,195 
15 TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO THE 1.94 906,432 
16 TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO 1. 78 831,114 
17 HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY THE 1. 74 811,226 
18 OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO 1.47 688,265 
19 FIRE & CASUALTY INS CO OF CONN THE 1.46 682.148 
20 LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION 1.46 680,874 
TOTAL FOR TOP 20 RANKED INSURERS 74.33 $ 34,656,036 
TOTAL FOR ALL 197 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE 100.00 $ 46,621,650 
National Practitioner Data Bank 
2000 Annual Report 
u.s. Department of Health and Human Services 
Health Resources and Services Administration 
Bureau of Health Professions 
Division of Quality Assurance 
5600 Fishers Lane, Suite SA-55 
Rockville, MD 20S57 
~~Humansemces 
He.11lI Resources & Service. Adminlsfralion 
Requests for copies of this report and information on the National Practitioner Data Bank should be directed to the 
Data Bank Customer Service Center, 1-800-767-6732. This report and other information is also available on the 
Internet at www.npdb-hipdb.com. 
TABLE 9: Mean and Median Physician Malpractice Payment and Mean Delay Between 
Incident and Payment by State 
(National Practitioner Data Bank, September 1,1990 - December 31,2000) 
2000 Only Cumulative 2000 Only Cumulative 
Mean Delay Between Mean Delay Between 
Mean Median Mean Median Rank of Incident and Payment Incident and Payment 
State Payment Payment Pavment Pavment Median (Years) (Years) 
Alabama $419,757 $200,000 $340,185 $149,900 5 4.47 4.30 
Alaska 190,851 100,000 215,891 75,357 33 4.17 3.92 
Arizona 260,017 150,000 204,043 90,000 24 4.03 3.80 
Ar1<ansas 220,591 91,880 156,838 90,000 24 3.80 3.43 
California 142,637 55,000 122,562 41,500 51 3.03 3.42 
Colorado 236,919 84,997 163,957 55,000 48 3.67 3.33 
Conneclicut 432,536 200,000 321,721 135,000 6 5.84 5.45 
Delaware 300,780 150,000 203,762 90,000 24 4.35 4.55 
Florida· 259,354 175,000 215,619 125,000 7 3.96 4.06 
Georgia 334,301 166,667 272,735 125,000 7 3.17 3.60 
Hawaii 252,541 120,000 236,383 75,000 36 3.42 4.11 
Idaho 259,187 100,000 206,974 50,000 49 3.33 3.33 
"'inois 457,855 250,000 314,680 175,021 1 5.45 5.82 
Indiana· 208,834 75,001 154,875 75,001 35 5.87 5.40 
Iowa 224,947 100,000 158,868 64,875 46 3.26 3.19 
Kansas· ... 152,740 175,000 164,208 106,000 15 3.17 4.03 
Kentucky 173,676 75,000 181,917 75,000 36 4.45 4.07 
Louisiana'" 174,110 99,999 136,913 85,000 30 5.26 4.91 
Maine 291,497 262,482 239,370 125,000 7 3.82 4,07 
Maryland 282,403 150,000 241,140 115,000 13 4.82 4.74 
Massachusetts 370,782 250,000 282,111 150,000 4 5.64 5.96 
Michigan 118,501 85,000 100,363 67,500 43 4.28 4.35 
Minnesota 219,533 100,000 176,093 72,555 41 2.99 3.16 
Mississippi 211,725 127,750 187,358 97,500 22 4.29 4.05 
Missouri 244,638 130,000 210,058 100,000 16 3.97 4.53 
Montana 235,909 125,000 149,354 60,000 47 4.30 4.30 
Nebraska· 181,255 116,250 118,679 70,000 42 3.65 3.89 
Nevada 317,017 175,000 241,242 100,000 16 4.84 4.27 
New Hampshire 265,192 111,000 242,281 125,000 7 4.70 4.85 
New Jersey 309,435 175,000 237,788 115,000 13 5.65 6.24 
New MexiCO· 189,018 100,000 132,400 90,000 24 4.22 383 
NewYor1< 299,572 150,000 256,071 125,000 7 6.28 7.06 
North Carolina 312,132 132,500 237,975 100,000 16 3.93 3.66 
North Dakota 294,939 143.750 167,869 17,500 32 3,31 3.49 
Ohio 241,636 115,000 215,103 90,000 24 4.58 4.50 
Oklahoma 275,620 121,000 241,215 75,128 34 3.56 3.85 
Oregon 280,034 141,500 177,817 75,000 36 3.42 3.41 
Pennsylvania· 250,754 192,755 211,680 150,710 3 5.71 5.99 
Rhode tsland 266,061 100,000 252,707 100,000 16 6.03 6.12 
South Carolina· 181,771 100,000 157,092 93,750 23 4.34 4.66 
South Dakota 208,319 100,000 199,158 65,500 44 3.34 3.48 
Tennessee 195,664 100,000 216,666 87,500 29 3.71 3.61 
Texas 194,039 110,000 175,346 100,000 16 3.68 3.90 
Utah 242,311 90,000 148,231 49,950 50 3.34 3.50 
Vermont 144,273 75,000 144,227 65,000 45 3.36 4.37 
Virginia 227,289 150,000 189,753 100,000 16 4.00 3.79 
Washington 238,655 90,000 193,612 75,000 36 4.34 4.38 
West Virginia 254,881 100,000 202,043 80,000 31 5.26 5.68 
Wisconsin· 358,075 162,857 322,035 125,000 7 4.54 4.89 
Wyoming 252,422 100,000 162,380 75,000 36 3.18 3.19 
WashinQton, DC 584,338 197,500 397,915 175,000 2 4.92 4.88 
All Reports $248,947 $125,000 $202,301 $99,500 4.66 4.83 
This table includes only disclosable reports in the NPDB as of December 31,2000. The All Reports row includes jurisdictions not listed 
above (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, etc.). 
Rank for payments is based on the median payment amount for each State; 1 is highest, 51 is lowest 
• These data are not adjusted for State compensation funds and other similar funds. Mean and median payments for States with payments 
made by these funds understate the actual mean and median of amounts received by claimants. Payments made by these funds may also 
affect men delay times between incidents and payments. States with these funds are marked with an asterisk . 
•• The 2000 mean malpractice payment for Kansas was less than the median payment, which is very unusual. There were no very large 
payments to pull the mean above the median. 
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o/iYlaSPh-chtiseffs 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY IN OPPOSITION 
TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AMENDMENT 
July 26, 2002 
For Immediate Release 
Contact: Jim Manley / Stephanie Cutter 
(202) 224-2633 
Mr. President, this amendment has nothing to do with the price of 
prescription drugs, the cost of health care, or even the insurance 
premiums of doctors. It has everything to do with the profits of the 
insurance industry. 
At a time in which Americans want greater corporate accountability - in 
this time of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals - it is 
unbelievable that our Republican friends now cozy up to big insurance 
corporations to give them a break. 
Let me remind my colleagues that the legislation before us is about the 
high price of prescription drugs and providing a Medicare prescription 
drug benefit. Now the Republican side is trying to divert attention from 
this important debate by offering this amendment. 
It is an attack on the very people which the underlying legislation was 
designed to help - those in need of quality medical care. The McConnell 
Amendment is designed to shield health care providers from basic 
accountability for the care they provide. While those across the aisle 
like to talk about doctors, the real beneficiaries will be insurance 
companies. This amendment would enrich the insurance industry at the 
expense of the most seriously injured patients; men, women and children 
whose entire lives have been devastated by medical neglect and corporate 
abuse. 
This proposal would also shield HMOs that fail to provide needed care, 
drug companies whose medicine has toxic side effects, and manufacturers of 
defective medical equipment. In recent months the entire nation has been 
focused on the need for greater corporate accountability. The McConnell 
Amendment does just the reverse. 
It would drastically limit the financial responsibility of the entire 
http://www .senate. gOY I-kennedy 1 statements/02/07 12002730 306.html 
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health care industry to compensate injured patients for the harm they have 
suffered. When will the Republican Party start worrying about injured 
patients and stop trying to shield big business from the consequences of 
its wrongdoing? Less accountability will never lead to better health care. 
This amendment places major new restrictions on the right of seriously 
injured patients to recover fair compensation for their injuries by 
placing arbitrary caps on compensation for non-economic loss. These caps 
only serve to hurt those patients who have suffered the most severe, life-
altering injuries and who have proven their cases in court. 
Non-economic damages compensate victims for the very real, but not easily 
quantifiable, losses they sustain when they suffer a serious injury, such 
as loss of mobility, paralysis, loss of bodily functions, blindness, 
disfigurement, severe and chronic pain, loss of consortium, or loss of 
reproductive capacity. These are life-altering conditions which can 
deprive a person of the ability to engage in many of the normal activities 
of day to day living. They are the last ones we should be depriving of 
fair compensation. 
Caps are totally arbitrary. They do not adjust the amount of the 
compensation ceiling with either the seriousness of the injury, or with 
the length of years that the victim must endure the resulting disability. 
Someone with a less serious injury can be fully compensated without 
reaching the cap. However, a patient with severe, permanent injuries is 
prevented by the cap from receiving full compensation for their more 
serious injuries. The person with a life-altering injury may only be 
permitted to receive a relatively small portion of the compensation to 
which he or she is entitled. Is it fair to apply the same limit on 
compensation to a person who is confined to a wheelchair for life that is 
applied to someone with a temporary leg injury? 
Caps discriminate against younger victims. A young person with a severe 
injury such as paralysis must endure it for many more years than an older 
person with the same injury. Yet, that young person is prohibited from 
receiving greater compensation for the many more years he will be 
disabled. Is that fair? 
Caps on noneconomic damages discriminate against women, children, 
minorities, and low income workers. These groups do not receive large 
economic damages attributable to lost earning capacity. Thus, noneconomic 
damages are particularly important to these vulnerable populations. 
Caps in medical cases discriminate against women: 
* Women are the victims of medical negligence more frequently than men. 
AMA reviewed 48 studies and determined gender discrimination in patient 
care is real. 
* Women more frequently sustain certain types of injuries which have 
grievous consequences, such as miscarriage and loss of reproductive 
capacity, disfigurement from cosmetic surgery, psychological injuries, but 
do not result in an extended inability to work. 
* Women who are homemakers and caregivers for their families sustain no 
lost wages when they are injured, so they only receive minimal economic 
damages. Ignoring the value of the work they do within the home violates 
9 
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the most basic family values. 
* Working women tend to have lower earnings than their male counterparts, 
and fewer years in the labor force. Thus, their economic damages are 
lower. 
Caps on noneconomic damages discriminate against children. Children who 
sustain lifelong injuries lack a documented earning capacity, and are 
often shortchanged in projecting their future lost earnings. Also, caps do 
not permit higher compensation for the greater number of years an injured 
child must live with his or her disability. 
Caps also discriminate against minorities and other low wage workers. 
Since they receive less in economic damages for the time they are 
incapacitated than higher paid workers, the only way to fairly compensate 
them is with noneconomic damages that are not arbitrarily capped. 
The elderly are also ill served by caps on noneconomic loss because caps 
put the primary focus for compensation on lost wages. For senior citizens, 
their life work is at or near an end. Thus, placing limits on how much can 
be recovered for pain and incapacity is really an arbitrary cap on their 
entire compensation. For patients in nursing homes, noneconomic damages 
are the principal financial incentive deterring medical neglect of the 
frail and elderly. 
If we were to arbitrarily restrict the compensation which seriously 
injured patients can receive as the sponsor of this amendment proposes, 
what benefits would result? Certainly less accountability for health care 
providers will never improve the quality of health care. It will not even 
result in less costly care. The cost of medical malpractice premiums 
constitutes less than two-thirds of 1% (0.66%) of the nation's health care 
expenditures each year. Malpractice premiums are not the cause of the high 
rate of medical inflation. Over the decade from 1988 to 1998, the cost of 
medical care rose 13 times faster than the cost of malpractice insurance. 
Caps are not only unfair to patients, they are also an ineffective way to 
control medical malpractice premiums. There is scant evidence to support 
the claim that enacting malpractice caps will lower insurance rates. There 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. There are other much more direct 
and effective ways to address the cost of medical malpractice insurance 
that do not hurt patients. 
The supporters of the McConnell amendment have argued that restricting an 
injured patient's right to recover fair compensation will reduce 
malpractice premiums. They cite a report released just yesterday by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. However, that data is neither 
comprehensive or persuasive. It looks at only ten of the twenty-seven 
states that do not currently have a cap on malpractice damages, and it 
looks at the rate of increase in those states for only one year. In 
essence, that report "cherry picks" the data to support a politically 
preordained conclusion. 
Let's look at the facts. Twenty-three states currently have a cap on 
medical malpractice damages. Most have had those statutes for a 
substantial number of years. Twenty-seven states do not have a cap on 
malpractice damages. The best evidence of whether such caps effect the 
cost of malpractice insurance is to compare the rates in those two groups 
of states. Based on data from the Medical Liability Monitor on all fifty 
states: 
* the average liability premium in 2001 for doctors practicing internal 
medicine was slightly less (2.2%) for doctors in states without caps on 
malpractice damages ($7,715) than in states with caps on damages ($7,887). 
Internists actually pay more for malpractice insurance in the states that 
have caps. 
* the average liability premium in 2001 for general surgeons was also 
slightly less (2.3%) for doctors in states without caps ($26,144) than 
states with caps ($26,746). Surgeons are also paying more in the states 
that have caps. 
* the average liability premium for OB/GYN physicians in 2001 was only 
3.3% more for doctors in states without caps ($44,485) than states with 
caps ($43,010), a very small difference. 
This evidence clearly demonstrates that capping malpractice damages does 
not benefit the doctors it purports to help. Their rates remain virtually 
the same. It only helps the insurance companies earn even bigger profits. 
Since malpractice premiums are not effected by the imposition of caps on 
recovery, it stands to reason that the availability of physicians does not 
differ between states that have caps and states that do not. AMA data 
shows that there are 233 physicians per 100,000 residents in states that 
do not have medical malpractice caps and 223 physicians per 100,000 
residents in states with caps. Looking at the particularly high cost 
specialty of obstetrics and gynecology, states without caps have 29 
OB/GYNs per 100,000 women while states with caps have 27.4 OB/GYNs per 
100,000 women. Clearly there is no correlation. 
California is the state that has had the lowest cap on malpractice damages 
the longest. It set a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in the mid 
1970s which has not been adjusted for inflation since. If the tort 
reformers are correct, you would expect California to have had a smaller 
percentage of growth in premiums since those caps were enacted. Between 
1991 and 2000, premiums in California actually grew more quickly (3.5%) 
than did premiums nationwide (1.9%). 
If this amendment were to pass, it would sacrifice fair compensation for 
injured patients in a vain attempt to reduce medical malpractice premiums. 
Doctors will not get the relief they are seeking. Only the insurance 
companies, which created the recent market instability, will benefit. 
Even supporters of the industry acknowledge that enacting tort reform will 
not produce lower insurance premiums: 
* Sherman Joyce, President of the American Tort Reform Association, told 
the Liability Week publication, "We wouldn't tell you or anyone that the 
reason to pass tort reform would be to reduce insurance rates." 
* Victor Schwartz, the Association's General Counsel, told Business 
Insurance, " ... many tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting 




* The American Insurance Association even released a statement earlier 
this year (March 13, 2002) acknowledging, '" [T]he insurance industry never 
promised that tort reform would achieve specific premium savings ... " 
A National Association of Insurance Commissioners study shows that in 
2000, the latest year for which data is available, total insurance 
industry profits as a percentage of premiums for medical malpractice 
insurance was nearly twice as high (13.6%) as overall casualty and 
property insurance profits (7.9%). In fact, malpractice was a very 
lucrative line of insurance for the industry throughout the 1990's. Recent 
premium increases have been an attempt to maintain high profit margins 
despite sharply declining investment earnings. 
Insurance industry practices are responsible for the sudden dramatic 
premium increases which have occurred in some states in recent months. The 
explanation for these premium spikes can be found not in legislative halls 
or in courtrooms, but in the boardrooms of the insurance companies 
themselves. 
There have been substantial increases in recent months in a number of 
insurance lines, not just medical malpractice. In 2001, rates for small 
commercial accounts have gone up 21%, rates for mid-size commercial 
accounts have gone up 32%, and rates for large commercial accounts have 
gone up 36%. These increases were attributable to general economic factors 
and industry practices, not medical liability tort law. 
Insurers make much of their money from investment income. During times 
when investments offer high profit, companies compete fiercely with one 
another for market share. They often do so by underpricing their plans and 
insuring poor risks. When investment income dries up because interest 
rates fall, the stock market declines, and/or cumulative price cuts lower 
profits, the insurance industry then attempts to increase its premiums and 
reduce its coverage. This is a familiar cycle which produces a 
manufactured crisis each time their investments turn downward. 
For example, St. Paul, one of the largest medical malpractice insurers, 
which has been experiencing serious financial difficulties lately, 
actually released $1.1 billion in reserves between 1992 and 1997 to 
enhance its bottom-line and make those dollars available for investment. 
Some of the company's investments did not go well. It lost $108 million in 
the collapse of Enron alone. When claims became due, those reserves were 
not available to pay them. 
A recent study by the Consumer Federation of America presented at a 
hearing of the Health Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce last week, documented this industry trend: "It is the "hard" 
insurance market and the insurance industry's own business practices that 
are largely to blame for the rate shock that physicians have experienced 
in recent months." The Consumer Federation's findings are highly 
enlightening: 
* "Medical malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial 
insurance rates are rising overall. * The rate problem is caused by the 
classic turn in the economic cycle of the industry, sped up - but not 
caused by - terrorist attacks. * Insurers have under-priced malpractice 
premiums over the last decade. It would take a 50 percent hike to increase 
inflation-adjusted rates to the same level as existed ten years ago. * 
Further limiting patients' rights to sue for medical injures would have 
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virtually no impact on lowering overall health care costs. Medical 
malpractice insurance costs as a proportion of national health care 
spending are minuscule, amounting to less than 60 cents per $100 spent. 
Insurer losses for medical malpractice have risen slowly in the last 
decade, by just over the rate of inflation. * Malpractice claims have not 
"exploded" in the last decade. Closed claims - which include claims where 
not payout was made - have remained constant, while paid claims have 
averaged just over $110,000. * Medical Malpractice profitability over the 
last decade has been excellent, at just over 12 percent (per year), 
despite a decline in profits in the last two years." 
This analysis of why we are seeing a sudden spike in premiums was 
basically confirmed by a June 24, 2002 Wall Street Journal article 
describing what happened to the malpractice insurance industry during the 
1990s. 
"Some of these carriers rushed into malpractice coverage because an 
accounting practice widely used in the industry made the area seem more 
profitable in the early 1990s than it really was. A decade of short-
sighted price slashing led to industry losses of nearly $3 billion last 
year. 
"I don't like to hear insurance - company executives say it's the tort 
[injury-law) system - it's self-inflicted," says Donald J. Zuk, chief 
executive of Scpie Holdings Inc., a leading malpractice insurer in 
California ... 
"The losses were exacerbated by carriers' declining investment returns. 
Some insurers had come to expect that big gains in the 1990s from their 
bond and stock portfolios would continue, industry officials say. When the 
bull market stalled in 2000, investment gains that had patched over 
inadequate premium rates disappeared." 
Let's look at the type of severely injured patients who would be denied 
fair compensation under the McConnell Amendment. These are the people who 
are being asked by those across the aisle to pay for the mismanagement of 
the insurance industry and the wrongdoing of health care providers: 
Leyda Uuam (from Massachusetts) underwent surgery to correct a protruding 
belly button when she was 5 weeks old. Leyda will never walk, talk, move, 
or have any normal function after she suffered brain injury due to a 
series of errors by anesthesiologists, nurses, and a transport team. 
When Mrs. Oliveira's unborn baby showed fetal distress her doctor failed 
to perform a timely cesarean birth as common sense would indicate. 
Instead, he attempted a forceps delivery. When this didn't work, he made 
three attempts at vacuum extraction, which were also unsuccessful. A 
different physician then attempted a second forceps delivery, which also 
failed. Finally, Oliveira underwent a cesarean section, yet her son died 
within an hour of his birth. An autopsy report identified the cause of 
death as asphyxia. The hospital, in an attempt to cover its negligence, 
amended the report falsely, listing the cause of death as probably fetal 
sepsis. 
Twelve year-old Steven Olsen is blind and brain damaged today because of 
medical negligence. When he was hiking, he fell on a stick in the woods. 
The hospital refused his parents' request for a CAT scan, and instead 
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pumped Steven full of steroids and sent him home with a growing brain 
abscess. The next day, Steven Olson became comatose and wound up back in 
the hospital. Had he received the $800 CAT scan, which would have detected 
the brain mass growing in his skull, Steven would be perfectly healthy 
today. The jury awarded Steven $7.1 million in non-economic damages for 
his life-sentencing of serious illness and disability. 
Harry Jordan, a man from Long Beach, underwent surgery to remove a 
cancerous kidney. The surgeon took out his healthy kidney instead. Jordan 
had been living for years on 10% kidney function, and he is now no longer 
able to work. 
Elizabeth, a former fashion model, went to the emergency room complaining 
of nausea, vomiting, and "the worst headache of her life." The doctor 
misdiagnosed her as having an acute neck sprain and sent her home. 
Unfortunately, he failed to diagnose her symptoms as the warning leak of a 
brain aneurysm even though he had written a textbook which included an 
entire chapter on warning leaks. Ten days after her hospital visit, 
Elizabeth's aneurysm ruptured and she had a stroke. The bleeding destroyed 
brain tissue, requiring the removal of 1/3 of the frontal lobe of her 
brain. Elizabeth was left paralyzed as a result of her misdiagnosed 
aneurysm. 
Philip Lucy's nasal cancer was misdiagnosed by doctors as high blood 
pressure and nerve damage for 2 years, although he continued to complain 
of pain. It was finally discovered that his left sinus was completely 
filled with a cancerous mass. This necessitated the removal of his left 
palate, left cheek, left orbit and his left eye. 
LeVern Dostal, a recent retiree, died a slow and painful death after her 
surgeon failed to give her antibiotics before her gallbladder surgery. She 
developed sepsis and was hospitalized for a lengthy period of time, during 
which she underwent 3 more surgeries, as her condition slowly 
deteriorated. 
Ms. Keck, 63, was admitted to the hospital for pneumonia. She sustained 
brain injuries because a nurse failed to monitor her oxygen level as 
instructed, and failed to notify the doctors of her worsening condition. 
She now suffers from paralysis and cannot speak. The hospital was 
purposefully understaffed to increase profits. 
Under the McConnell Amendment, each of these people would be prevented 
from recovering more than $250,000 in non-economic compensation. Can 
anyone claim that would be fair? 
As we debate this amendment, let us all remember that we are dealing with 
people's lives - many of them have suffered life-altering injuries as a 
result of substandard medical care. The law is there to protect them, not 
to shield those who caused their injuries. 
-30-
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AlA CITES FATAL FLAWS IN CRITIC'S REPORT ON TORT REFORM 
Washington, D.C., March 13,2002 - A recent report claiming that state tort reform 
laws have failed to lower insurance premiums is a grossly inaccurate and misleading 
attempt to sabotage the continuing need for meaningful tort reform, according to the 
American Insurance Association's (AlA) review of the report. 
"Premium Deceit _ The Failure of Tort Reform to Cut Insurance Prices," issued by 
the Center for Justice and Democracy and co-authored by insurance industry critic 1. 
Robert Hunter, is a report whose hypothesis, methodology and conclusions are 
riddled with flawed logic, bias and inaccurate statements," said Debra Ballen, AlA 
executive vice president. 
"The report is neither 'the most extensive review of insurance rate activity .... ever 
taken,' nor an accurate evaluation of the tort reform movement in the late twentieth 
century," said Ballen. "Instead, the authors have spun a biased yam reflecting their 
own distaste for tort reform and efforts to mislead readers as to the continuing need 
for meaningful tort reform." 
The report's conclusion that, contrary to insurers' promises, state tort reform laws 
have failed to achieve lower premiums, fails in four crucial respects: 
1. Insurers never promised that tort reform would achieve specific savings, but rather 
focused on the benefits of fairness and predictability. 
2. The authors' methodology is deeply flawed. Problems include an incorrect time 
period analysis and an irrational method of classifying states. 
3. The authors' "success test" is overly simplistic and misleading, since liability rules 
are just one factor determining claim costs, and claim costs are just one factor 
determining the ultimate cost of insurance. Claim costs are also influenced by 
accident frequency, population density, medical inflation and underlying economic 
conditions. And there are other state-specific factors that affect premium levels, such 
as taxes, fees and the degree of market competition. 
4. The report ignores all data and evidence of the broader benefits of tort reform, such 
as increased equity for all parties and improved system predictability. 
Businesses, citizen groups, and insurers across the country view tort reform as 
enhancing the rights of those who are truly injured to obtain compensation from those 
who are truly at fault, while weeding out frivolous and fraudulent claims. "In other 
words, a more balanced legal system for all parties," said Ballen. 
"Contrary to the authors' erroneous conclusions, tort reform has helped to make the 
civil justice system fairer, and it has improved insurance market conditions by 
making insurance costs more stable and predictable. And that is what happened 
http://www.aiadc.org/outboundicreditlCR_7027_42~J.htm 10/21/2002 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, due in part to the refonns of the mid-to-Iate 1980s." 
### 
The American Insurance Association represents more than 412 major insurance companies that 
provide all lines of property and casualty insurance and write more than $87 billion annually in 
premiums. The association is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has representatives in every 
state. All AlA press releases are available at www.aiadc.Qrg. 
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TORT REFORMS DON'T CUT LIABILITY RATES, STUDY SAYS 
Insurance premiums have not dropped in states where tort reform measures have been enacted, a new study by a 
consumers group concludes. 
By comparing tort reform measures enacted by states since 1985 with the states' insurance rates, the report found 
that tort reform has had no impact on commercial rates. This finding contradicts claims by tort reform supporters 
that laws restricting litigation will reduce insurance costs, according to the study, issued by the Citizens for Corporate 
Accountability & Individual Rights, a New York-based non-profit consumer group. 
"Officials have been severely misled into believing that if they passed these laws, insurance rates would drop in their 
states," Joanne Doroshow, CCAIR's executive director and co-author of the study, said at a press conference last 
week in New York announcing the findings. 
''There is a hoax being perpetrated on the public and lawmakers in this country," she further stated. ''This report 
undermines the principal argument used today by tort reform proponents that the system is too costly." 
Tort reform advocates, however, say the study misstates their position and fails to take into account all the factors 
that influence insurance rates. 
The study looked at tort reform laws passed by states from 1985 through 1998. These laws include caps on punitive 
damages or modifications to the rule of joint-and-several liability. 
By examining the number of laws and providing greater weight to those enacted in earlier years, the states were 
divided into three groups: those with the fewest tort limits, those with moderate limits and those with the most. 
The study then gathered information from the Insurance Services Office Inc. on rates it recommends insurers charge 
in each state for the different liability lines. 
Then, the study compared the different state laws and rates to see if those states with more tort reform laws had 
lower insurance rates. 
Three areas of insurance were examined: general liability, product liability and medical malpractice liability. 
The results showed that there is no relation between more tort reform and lower insurance rates. 
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"It's clear as to the whole system, tort reform has not worked," concluded J. Robert Hunter, co-author of the study 
and director of insurance for the Consumer Federation of America in Washington, O.c. 
For example, the states with the fewest tort reforms saw general liability rate increases of 45.6% between 1985 and 
1998, while those with modest reforms saw general liability rates rise 49.1 % and those with the most tort reforms 
saw such rates rise by 48.8% during that period, the report states. 
In the area of product liability, the states with fewest reforms saw rates increase by 80.4%, those with modest 
reforms saw 52% increases, and those with the most reforms saw rates increase by 74.8%. 
Medical malpractice results show the same lack of direct correlation between tort reform and lower insurance rates, 
the report found. 
Even though medical malpractice rates showed the lowest increase in states with the most reforms, the rates were 
lower in states with few reforms than they were in states with moderate reform. In states with the fewest reforms, 
medical malpractice rates increased 179.5% between 1985 and 1998, while those with moderate reforms saw rates 
increase 214.5% and those with the most reforms saw rate hikes totaling 120.2% during that period. 
Based on these findings, the report calls illogical the assumption that more tort reform measures will result in lower 
rates. 
'The only reasonable conclusion is that no clear evidence of tort law change impacting insurance prices is 
determinable from these data," the report states. 
A similar picture appeared when individual states' experience was examined. 
For example, in Wisconsin, where few reforms were passed, general liability rates climbed 19.2%, while neighboring 
Minnesota, a high reform state, saw its rates rise by 19.5%. Similarly, in Massachusetts, which passed no tort reform 
laws at all, rates rose by 25.9%, while Connecticut, where three laws were passed in the 1980s, saw rates rise 
61.5%. 
The report was criticized by tort reform advocates. 
Victor Schwartz, a partner with the Washington law firm of Crowell & Moring and a leading tort reform advocate, said 
"just looking at rates doesn't answer the question," as many insurance policies may have higher rates because they 
offer broader coverage or a lower deductible. 
But, more importantly, he said, many tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting litigation will lower 
insurance rates. "I've never said that in 30 years," he said. 
He also pOinted out that insurers can't rely on tort reform measures in formulating rates because the laws are often 
watered down with exceptions or are struck down by courts as unconstitutional. But a solid tort reform measure 
without easy exceptions that is upheld as constitutional will reduce insurance rates, Mr. Schwartz said. 
Sherman Joyce, president of the American Tort Reform Assn. in Washington, agreed, saying that tort reform is not 
just about lower insurance rates. 
"We think the real focus (of tort reform) should be on (restricting) the payment of punitive damages," rather than on 
lowering insurance costs, he said. 
Although he hadn't yet seen the study, Patrick Watts, assistant vp for the Alliance of American Insurers in Downers 
Grove, III., questioned its sponsor's goal. 
"Do they want to eliminate all restrictions on litigation?" he asked. 
While, in theory, tort reform measures should reduce insurance costs, "tort reform is only one thing in the mix" that 
determines insurance rates, he said. 
Copies of "Premium Deceit -- The Failure of 'Tort Reform' to Cut Insurance Prices" are available for $100 by sending 
a check or money order to CCAIR, P.O. Box 3326, Church Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10008. 
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State insurance program holds off 
on lowering rates 
By JOELLE BABULA 
REVIEW -JOURNAL 
Doctors insured by the state's emergency liability insurance program will not 
see a drop in premiums soon. 
The state's Medical Liability Association of Nevada is the second insurance 
company in two weeks to announce premiums will not be lowered despite 
passage of a new medical malpractice bill. The bill was passed to help stem 
the exodus of doctors who cannot find malpractice insurance or afford the 
skyrocketing rates. 
"We're not lowering rates anytime soon," said Bob Byrd, chairman of the 
Medical Liability Association of Nevada. "It's really premature to jack prices 
back right now. We're very pleased with the tort reform package, and we're 
optimistic about the future and the end result, but we won't know the end 
result for another year or two. " 
The company was formed in April as a last resort for Nevada doctors who 
cannot find medical malpractice insurance. The company insures 251 
doctors. 
Last week American Physicians Assurance said it would not be reducing 
premIUms soon. 
Although doctors were hoping insurance companies would roll back 
premiums after the passage of new legislation, most say they realize the laws 
will take several years to have an effect on the insurance industry. 
"Meaningful tort reform was not expected to dramatically change the pricing 
of insurance premiums," Dr. Ikram Khan said. "The stability in the market 
comes after a period of time. It's unrealistic to expect dramatic change." 
Khan said doctors must decide whether they can wait a few years to see 
relief. 
Nearly 150 doctors have left the state, retired early or are preparing to leave. 
Others, such as obstetricians and trauma surgeons, have stopped providing 
high-risk surgeries or delivering babies. 
http://www.lvrj.comlcgi-biniprintable.cgi?llvrL home/2002/ Aug-14-Wed-2002/news/19408... 9/612002 
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Most Clark County obstetricians stopped taking new patients in May because 
they said they could not afford to deliver more babies. Many of them began 
taking new patients again after the legislation's passage. 
Dr. John Nowins, president of the Clark County OB/GYN Society, said 
many obstetricians began taking new patients this week in good faith that 
insurance companies would start to lower prices. He said the doctors may 
have to close their doors again if prices do not come down. 
"Obstetricians are still in a bind," he said. "I can't be too optimistic." 
According to the society, 33 obstetricians have closed their practices, retired 
early or have stopped delivering babies because of medical liability 
problems. 
This story is located at: 
http://www.lvrj.comllvrj home120021 Aug-14-Wed-2002/newsI19408288.html 
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- If, mdeed, It IS a capitulation, and 
lIot another malleuver by the wily 
Mr. Milosevic to gam time and con-
solidate hIS gams - heralds the ac-
ceptance of a new global police mis-
sion by the West, however bold the 
pronouncements and self-congratu-
lation last week. 
From the outset, the Untted Statps Returning from a bombIng mission over Yugoslavia, the piiot at dn !--ISE Eaglo awatts t) 
T '1e ~) q MI"lll'On (~';n {',f ('()t"fpf> l. It- .... , . . V u..f:/ . _ j. L __ ~" 
Whel the Verdic ~ 
By \\_. 
----
HERE'S aIle' c', story ahout Ample"" S out-ol-.cont .. :;: C8UrtS: Southern Pc::':.: Railroad was so besieged by frivolous laWSUIts in one Texas county that It 
Clpped up 28 miles of track and shut down opera-
110ns m the early 1990's. 
Like similar anecdotes in almost every state, 
the tale of the dIsgusted railroad has been repeat-
cd lor years in Texas. It even made its way into a 
. conservative research center's report as proof of 
~what most people believe anyway: havoc is being 
wreaked and Jobs lost by an irrational legal 
system. 
""t, lIke many legal horror stories, it may not 
have been 100 percent true. "It was kind of " 
coincidence of timmg," said Mark Davis, ,.: 
spokesman lor UnIOn Pacific, which merged witt 
SQuthern PaCIfic in 1996. "Southern Pacific wa' 
studying that Itne to b~ abandoned anyway." 
For years across the country, accounts of hi 
za~re jury verdicts and huge damage award, 
(like the McDonald's customer who spilled colfe. 
on herself and collected $2.9 millIon) have beer: 
used to prove that the courts are wacky or worse 
But l11creasingly, some political scientists, legal 
,cholars and consumer advocates are suggesting 
that outlandish examples have created a distort· 
~d picture of the legal system. 
Huge punitive damage awards, for example, 
have become everyday events, right? Actually, a 
studv of courts in the nation's 75 largest countle, 
conducted by the National Center for State Court: 
found that onlv 364 of 762,000 cases ended ir 
punitive damages, or 0.047 percent. 
O.K., but isn't it true that more and man 
liability claims are filed every year? Actually, , 
study of 16 states by the same center showed tha' 
the number of liability suits has declined by!' 
percent since 1986. 
Well, didn't that McDonald's coffee drinke! 
laugh all the way to the bank? Maybe, but she wa~ 
81 years old, the coffee was scalding and Shl 
needed skin grafts for thtrd-degree burns. Am 
,.he settled for about Sr,OO.OOO after a judge ro 
duced the 1994 jury award. 
Marc Galanter, a law professor at the Utliversi, 
ty of Wisconsin, described these popular stories 
about the courts as "legal legends" 111 the Arizona 
Law Review last year. The label is sticking and 
some scholars and consumer advocates are start-
ing to systematically challenge their accuracy. 
They say legends like the one about the Texas 
railroad have been used to maximum effect by a 
natIOnal business-supported movement to make 
it harder for plaintiffs to win lawsuits under tort 
law, which governs civil inlury claims. Just last 
week, the Alabama Legislature passed sweeping 
tort law changes, including a bill that would put a 
cap on punitive damages awarded by juries, 
Tony Cenleo!a for Thf' Nn' York Times 
M(Donald's now posts warnings on its 
coHee cups. 
a Fantas~y 
.dy every state has conSidered similar 
:res since the mid-1980's, and most have 
iJassed some measures to limit lawsuits. 
. "The story of tort reform across the country is 
that it is one of the most carefully developed and 
l'xquisitely executed political campaigns ever," 
said Andrew F. Popper, a law professor at Ameri-
can University in Washington who is an expert on 
personal l11.1ury law and identifies himself as a 
supporter of consumer rights. 
One advocate's distortion, of course, is anoth-
er's innocent spin. David Shaffer, president of the 
Public PolIcy Institute, a New York business 
group pushl11g for lawsuit limits in New York, 
said examples of ostensible outrages are used by 
consumer advocates as well as business groups. 
"It's done on both sides," he said. "The trial 
fa,,),ers drag in pIctures portraying some person 
who has been a victim of a terrible accident." 
EVEN if there are occasional exaggera· tions, som. e business lobbyists say, there are enough large verdicts to mtlmldate corporatIon, mto large settlements and 
inhibit innovation by making companies fearful 
of bringmg out new products that might attract 
lawsuits. The possibility of huge jury awards and 
the expense of battling suits, they say, combine to 
~eep useful products off consumers' shelves. 
But some lawvers and academics argue that 
:onslstently far-fetched accounts of court rulings 
have warped the debate about the legal system. 
And shrewd public relations by bUSIness and 
other groups pushmg to limit lawsuits may only 
be part of the reason. 
Unusual or big verdicts make news, saId Mi-
chael W. McCann, a political science professor at 
the University of Washington. Professor McCann 
and William Haltom of the University of Puget 
Sound in Tacoma, Wash., found in a study that the 
large McDonald's verdict got extensive front-
page coverage in 1994. But only about half the 
newspapers carried articles when the judge later 
"educed the punitive damages to $480,000. 
In similar research, Oscar G. Chase, a law 
( ontlnued on Paf,e 6 
; (i q 'i 
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SIOn of separatISts III East Timor, 
and why II has kept silent about 
Kashmir. The notIon of NATO planes 
bombing Israel to get Its troops out of 
the West Bank, or Canada to free 
Quebec, or England to get it out of 
Northern Ireland, have become the 
Continued on Page 4 
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This Is Big! 
Science finally 
learns to measure 
th e universe. 
By George Johnson 6 
5 
But est:matmg dlS~a!1(,ps beyond 
:he range of parailax - recently 
iet at a mere few hundred light-
years - has required more Imagi-
nation. The Carnegie observations 
rely on stars called Cepheid vari-
ables, which bhnk at a rate be-
lieved to vary with their bright-
ness. If two of these beacons are 
pulsatmg at the same pace and one 
appears dimmer, then it is as-
sumed to be farther away. But the 
system is fraught with uncertainty. 
To confidently measure absolute 
as opposed to relative distance, you 
have to calibrate the yardstick by 
directly measuring how far away 
the nearest Cepheids are. Astrono-
mers have tried to do this using 
parallactic observations by the Eu-
ropean Space Agency satellite Hip-
parcos. But the measurements are 
tricky and the data unsure. 
And there are other problems. A 
CepheId's rhythm may be thrown 
off by its metallic content More 
guesswork comes in when astrono-
mers try to Judge how much of the 
dimming of a Cepheid's light 
comes nor from distance but inter-
vening cosmic dust. 
THE results from the Very Long Baseline Array cut through these assump-tions, measuring the dlS-
-.:fance of a galaxy (NGC 4258 in the 
,v:onstellation Ursa Major) with old-
fashioned parallax. By using com-
puters to coordinate the data from 
10 radiO telescopes, ranging from 
Hawaii across North America to 
the Virgin Islands, the astrono-
mers essentially simulated a dish 
antenna thousands of miles wide. 
This let them measure the galaxy's 
radio wave emissions with a reso-
lution so fine that it puts even the 
Hubble telescope to shame. 
The astronomers focused on a 
rotating disk of gas at the galaxy's 
core. First thev calculated how fast 
it was spmning by measuring how 
much the Doppler effect stretched 
and squeezed its radio waves. Then 
they compared this intrinsic veloci-
ty to how fast the disk appears to 
spin from Earth. The farther some-
thing is, the slower it seems to 
move - parallax again. Think of 
how a jet plane seems to inch 
across the sky. Trigonometry then 
yields the distance. 
Though this new method greatly 
expands the power of parallax, it 
still has its limits. The galaxy was 
measured at 23.5 million light-
years away; the universe is bil-
lions of light-years wide. Reaching 
farther will still require Cepheids 
and other indirect methods. But 
now there may be a better way to 
ensure the accuracy of these yard-
sticks, putting a more solid founda-
tion under astronomers' feet. 
nearly 'itJ6JI{I(I VISitors. The recent Jackson Pol-
lock show at the Museum of MOdern Art in New 
York also proved a bonanza, drawing nearly 
330,000 visitors, a striking number, if still short of 
the 940,000 - more than 8,000 a day - who 
swamped the museum's Matisse show of 1991. 
The John Singer Sargent show, which closed 
last week at the National Gallery in Washington, 
drew about 425,000 viSitors, or nearly 4,500 a day, 
catapulting it into the realm of the smash 1995 
Edward. Kealln&fThe Ne ..... York Times 
A motorcycle exhibit drew a record half-million visitors last year to the Guggenheim Museum, 
Sometimes, the Verdict Is a Fantasy 
Continued From Page 1 
professor at New York University, 
found in a survey of cases in the New 
York area that the average verdict 
reported by The New York Times in 
1989 was $20.5 million. But including 
the much larger number of cases 
that did not attract media attention, 
the .verage verdict was really $1.1 
million. 
"Policy makers," Mr. Chase said 
in an interview, "can't reliably use 
their impressions from reading the 
press about issues like whether the 
court system is out of control." 
The problem, some legal experts 
say, is that policy makers do rely on 
such impressions. In his law review 
article, Professor Galanter traced 
the long afterlife of an infamous 1986 
case involving a Philadelphia psy-
chic who won a $1 million verdict. 
She had claimed she had an allergic 
reaction to medical treatment and 
lost her psychic powers. 
The story of the psychic's verdict 
was widely Circulated. Eventually, 
Professor Galanter found, it found 
its way into a 1991 report of the 
President's Council on Competitive-
ness, which referred to such bizarre 
cases as "almost commonplace" but 
did not disclose that the psychic's 
verdict had been reversed and that 
she had collected nothing. 
Business groups say they are at a 
disad,-antage in a public relations 
war that often spotlights alarming 
accounts of supposedly risky prod-
ucts, dangerous drugs and cancer-
causing chemicals. "Emotions are 
stirred more when people are fright-
ened for their own safety than they 
are by large damage awards that 
are not going to be paid out of their 
own money," said Victor E. 
Schwartz, a Washington lawyer who 
lobbies for businesses on tort issues. 
But consumer groups say ac-
counts of ostensible outrages in the 
courts seem more methodically mis-
leading than reports about product 
dangers. A recent report by Citizens 
lor Corporate Accountability and In-
dividual RIghts, a New York con-
sumer group, said the Public Policy 
Institute had "misreported and mis-
used" every case it described in its 
efforts to show that the New York 
courts were out of control. 
"They usually don't mention that 
the defendant did anything wrong," 
said the consumer group's executive 
director, Joanne Doroshow, a former 
associate of Ralph Nader. 
One supposedly outrageous case 
the Institute cited in a report last 
year involved an award of $650,000 
given by New York City to the family 
of a drunk driver who was killed in 
an accident while driving the wrong 
wayan a parkway. The Institute did 
not disclose that the court said the 
city's signs "virtually invited wrong-
way entry," the consumer group 
said. 
A SKED whether the report was misleading, Mr. Shaffer of the Public Policy Insti-tute said anecdotes were 
less important than the harmful im-
pact of the overall legal system on 
corporate innovation. "It is impossi-
ble," he added, "to include complete 
information about everything." 
True or false, legal legends do 
make effective debating points. In a 
series of interviews recentlv in Tex-
as, several leaders of a movement to 
end "lawsuit abuse" mentioned the 
case of the railroad that abandoned 
Matagorda County in Texas because 
of excessive lawsuits. 
Richard W_ Weekley, a Houston 
businessman who is a leader of Tex-
ans for Lawsuit Reform, said in a 
recent interview he had used the 
railroad story for years in speeches 
as an example of legal craziness. 
Audiences are horrified, he said. 
"People sit there and say, 'Why is a 
railroad tearing up 28 miles of 
track?' " Mr. Weekley said. 
In response to an inquiry from a 
reporter, Mr. Davis, the railroad 
spokesman, said" Litigation was last 
on the totem pole" among reasons 
for ceaSing operations in Matagorda 
County. "Traffic Was down to one 
freight car a year." 
Legal Legends: A Quiz 
Consumer advocates and some legal scholars say the public's image 
of the legal system is coloreo by myths. Test your s~sceptibility. 
A \taman W(l~ a multi-million dollar award from McDonald's in 1994 after 
she sp,/led ordl'lary coffee on herself 
1I False, McDonald's coHee was at least 20 degrees P hotter than In other restaurants and the company had 
S received some 700 complaints about burns in the (Y\ prevIous decade. The woman later settled for $600,000 after a judge reduced the $2.9 million jury award. 
A West Virginia convenience srare wo'ker won more than $2. 7 million a 
few years ago after she Injured her back while opening a pickle jar. 
True, But a court said her employer discharged her 
because her inlury restflcted her activity. then 
retali2ted against her and engaged in -willful, mean-
spirited acts indicative of an intent to cause physical or 
emotional harm: 
Cities are routinely forced to pay gargantuan awards for frivolous suits. 
False, In New York City, for example, 29,835 new 
claims were filed in 1997. In the same year 38 cases 
were resolved for $1 million or more, representing 26 
percent of the total paid out that year. The plaintiffs 
were found to have malar Injuries like paralysis and 
brain damage as a result of accidents with city vehicles 
and of malpractice at city hospitals. 
America has 70 percent of the world's lawyers 
,'If: tlons from New York to Singapore. Marc Galanter, 8 
False, This has been repeated for years by figures like II 0," O~" ," 1m, ?~. "we" ""'~ 0<,"'''. 
, , University of Wisconsin law professor. says it is "global 
folklore" and estimates that America has a quarter of 
the total. He is not. however, arguing for more lawyers. 
Llabi/ltv cases are out of control. 
D True and false, A study of 16 states found that there B· .:' ,were 58 percent more liability cases filed in 1997 than '. ,'''-. in 1975. But the same study showed that there were 9 percent fewer cases filed in 1997 than in 1986. 
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Testimony of 
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director 
Consumer Federation of America 
Before the 
Subcommittee on Health 
of Ute House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
Regarding Medicall\1alpractice 
Good morning. I am Travis Plunkett, legislative director for the Consumer Federation of 
America. CF A is a non-profit association of more than 290 organizations founded in 1968 to 
advance the consumer interest through advocacy and education. Ensuring the provision of fairly 
priced and adequate insurance has been one of our core concerns since CFA's inception. 
I would like to thank Chainnan Bilirakus, Ranking Member Brown and the other members of 
the Subcommittee for the opportunity to offer our comments on this extremely important issue. 
For the third time in less than thirty years, Congress and state legislators across the country are 
grappling with the problem of fast-rising medical malpractice rates. Insurers insist that a sharp 
increase in large, unwarranted jury verdicts is to blame for the crisis. As a result, lawmakers on 
this Subcommittee and in a variety of states are considering legislation to place further limits on 
the legal rights of Americans who have been harmed or killed by medical malpractice. 
But research by actuary and CF A Director ofInsurance 1. Robert Hunter shows that insurers 
are pointing fmgers when they should be looking in the mirror. It is the "hard" insurance market 
and the insurance industry's own business practices that are largely to blame for the rate shock 
that physicians have experienced in recent months. CF A has found that: 
£S Medical malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial insurance rates are 
rising overall. 
£s The rate problem is caused by the classic tum in the economic cycle of the industry, sped 
up--but not caused by--terrorist attacks. 
£s Insurers have under-priced malpractice premiums over the last decade. It would take a 
50 percent rate hike to increase inflation-adjusted rates to the same level as existed ten 
years ago. 
£s Further limiting patients' rights to sue for medical injuries would have virtually no 
impact on lowering overall health care costs. Medical malpractice insurance costs as a 
proportion of national health care spending are miniscule, amounting to less than 60 cents 
per $100 spent. 
£s Insurer losses for medical malpractice have risen slowly in the last decade, by just over 
the rate of inflation. 
£s Malpractice claims have not "exploded" in the last decade. Closed claims-which 
include claims where no payout was made-- have remained constant, while paid claims 
have averaged just over $110,000. 
£s Medical Malpractice profitability over the last decade has been excellent, at just over 12 
percent, despite a decline in profits in the last two years. 
I. Putting Medical Malpractice Insurance Rates into Context: Insurer Practices 
and the Insurance Cycle 
A. Commercial Insurance Rates Overall Are Rising 
To put price increases in insurance anywhere in America today into context, you have to be 
aware of a general tendency toward higher rates nationally. According to data released by the 
1 
Council ofInsurance Agents (CCIA) and Brokers,l commercial premiums are increasing 
quickly. According to estimates made by CF A based upon the CCIA data for the 12-month 
period ending December 31, 200 I, average prices rose as follows: 
Small Commercial Accounts 
Mid-size Commercial Accounts 
Large Commercial Accounts 
+21% 
+32% 
The worst hit are, not surprisingly, "terrorist target" risks, such as skyscrapers, 
















rate increases are occurring even when terrorism is excluded. 
The market shows all the earmarks of a classic cycle bottom, which is discussed in some detail 
below, 
B. There is a Classic" Hard" Cycle Nationallv--with Prices Rising Accelerated by 
the Events of September 11 th 
Insurance is a cyclical business. This is particularly true in the medical malpractice 
insurance business. In the mid-1970s, the country experienced the fIrst liability insurance CrISis. 
In this case, the crisis was particularly acute in product liability insurance and medical 
malpractice insurance, 
At the mid-70s cycle low, the industry's rate of return was "2.6% in 1975," rose "to 
19.7% in 1977, a gain of almost 17 points in the course of only two years. The industry's rate of 
return then fell by more than 17 points over the next 7 years to 1.9% in 1984, the nadir of that 
soft market During the subsequent hard market, profits once again shot up ... to 15.4%" (by 
1987).2 
The rnid-1980s crisis was in commercial liability generally, hitting municipalities, day 
care centers, environmental liability, medical malpractice and many other liability risks and 
lines. Time magazine had a cover story called "Sorry America, Your Coverage is Cancelled." 
I 4th Quarter 2001 Survey, released January 2002. 
2 Cycles and Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington and 
Klell1. NAIC, 1991. Page 11 
2 
Two charts below show the cyclical nature of insurance. 3 The first chart, "Insurance 
Cycle" shows the operating income as a percentage of premium from 1967 to 2001. The 
operating income of the industry falls below zero four times on the chart - in 1975, in 1984 and 
1985, in 1992, and in 2001 (the last number estimated by CFA). 
INSURANCE CYCLE 
15 -----.. 
-10 ---- -_._ .. -'- .. -'~---' 
YEAR (2001 estimated) 
The 1992 data point was not a classic cycle bottom, but reflected the impact of Hurricane 
Andrew and other catastrophes in that year. 
The 1975 and mid-80s bottoms were both classic cycle bottoms with very sizeable price 
increases and coverage availability problems immediately following the bottom. Consider the 
mid-80s cycle tum: between 1977 and 1984, insurance premiums had" ... actually declined (by) 
4.4% ... from 1984 to 1987, net premiums written increased 63.3% .. .',4 
The price increases in this cycle tum began in late 2000.5 The rate of change was 
accelerating upward before September 11 tho The terrorist attacks sped up the price increases into 
what some seasoned industry analysts see as gouging.6 Many examples of unjustified price 
increases have surfaced in the last few months. 7 8 
3 Both ofthese charts use data from A. M. Best and Co., Aggregates and Averages, 2001 edition for all years 
except 2001, where CF A made estimates ofthe results based on current information. 
4 Cycles and Crises in PropertY/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington and 
Klein, NAIC, 1991. Page 8. 
5 "The Big Question For 2002: Will Hard Market Last Long?" By Sean F. Mooney, National Underwriter, January 
7, 2002 edition. 
6 " ... there is clearly an opportunity now for companies to price gouge - and it's happening ... But I think companies 
are overreacting, because they see a window in which they can do it." Jeanne Hollister, consulting actuary, 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, in, "Avoid Price Gouging, Consultant Warns," National Underwriter, January 14, 2002. 
7 "As Insurers Hike Prices, State Regulators Consider Reducing Regulatory Authority," Consumer Federation of 
America, December 5, 2001. 
8 "We've seen premiums go up as much as 40-70 percent," says (Jenny] Jones [CEO of Elkins/Jones insurance 
brokerage]. She points out that commercial buildings which now pay five or six cents per square foot for insurance 
need to budget for costs to go up to as much as seven or eight cents a foot. She says the increases could be across 
the board for all types of properties. Single family housing developers could be sharply affected, she notes, citing 
3 
Gougmg does occur as the cycle turns.9 The evidence is very strong that what we 
are experiencing is a classic underwriting cycle turn into a "hard," from a prolonged "soft," 
market. 
According to the National Association ofInsurance Commissioners, " ... underwriting 
cycles may be caused by some or all of the follm.ving factors: 
L Adverse loss shocks ... unusually large loss shock ... may lead to supra-
competitive prices. 
2. Changes in interest rates ... 
3 lJ d .. . ft k ,.10 . n er pncmg m so mar ets ... -
Prior to September 11 th, the industry since the late 1980s. The 
usual six to ten year economic cycle had been the amazing stock market of the 
1 No matter how much they cut their rates, the insurers wound up with a great year \vhen 
investing the float on the premium in this amazing market (the "float" occurs during the time 
between when premiums are paid into the insurer and losses paid out by the insurer - e.g., there 
is about a 15 month lag in auto insurance). Further, interest rates were relatively high in recent 
years as the Fed focused on inflation. 
But, m the last two years, the market turned with a vengeance and the Federal Reserve 
cut interest rates again and again. Item 2 above had occurred well before September I J lh 
Item 3 above, the low rates, were also apparent. The chart, "Insurance Cycle," shows the 
operating profit drop from about 13% of premium in 1997 to about 3.5% of premium in 2000. 
So, before September 11 th, the cycle had turned, rates were rising and a hard market was 
developing. An anticipated price jump of 10% to 15% in 2001 was predicted by CF A and 
confirmed by the Insurance Information Institute. 
Item 1, the shock loss was all that was missing. September II th provided that in an 
achingly painful way. 
However, the increases are mostly due to the cycle turn. The price increases were sped 
up by the terrorist attack, collapsing two years of anticipated increases into a few months, but the 
bulk of the increases are not related to pricing for terrorism, per se. This is a classic economic 
cycle. 
one homebuilder whose liability premium doubled at the November 11 renewal." "Large Insurance Premium 
Increases in 2002 as September 11 Ricochets Through Industry, Expert Advises," Business Wire. January 3, 2002. 
9 "To be sure, the market began firming in 2000. But the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks sent insurance prices 
skyrocketing far beyond the estimates of increases that earlier were being attributed to a normal hard cycle." ., Year 
in Review," Business Insurance, December 24,2001. 
10 Cycles and Crises in PropertY/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington 
and Klein, NAIC, 1991. Page 339. 
4 
The question we hear a lot of debate about is how long the hard market can last. Given 
the amazing inflow of capital, can the prices hold for long? While the jury is still out on that 
question, there are some factors that make it seem likely that the hard market will be brief. They 
include: 
? The capital inflow in excess of the after-tax terrorism loss, 
? The relatively overcapitalized position of the industry as shown in the chart, "Leverage 
Ratio," below, 
? The availability of alternative risk mechanisms to the larger client risks, the insureds with 
the biggest price hikes, 
? The pattern of risk managers blaming insurers, not the terrorism event, for renewal 
problems, and shopping for better deals. II 
LEVERAGE RATIO (Target = 2.0) 
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A "leverage ratio" is the ratio of net premiums written (i.e., after reinsurance) to the 
surplus, the amount of money the insurer has to back up the business; assets less the liabilities. 
Surplus is not reserves, which are liabilities set up to cover claims. The leverage ratio has 
always been the key measure of insurer strength. 
The rule of thumb used for decades by insurance regulators and other experts in 
determining solidity is the so-called" Kenny I 2 Rule" of $2 of premium for each $1 of surplus as 
safe and efficient use of capital. Some now say that this rule is antiquated, given the new level 
of catastrophe possible, but new ways of spreading the risk, such as securitizing it, may offset 
this. CFA still believes a 2: I ratio is safe. But even those proposing a lower ratio do not go 
below 1.5:1. The NAIC uses a 3:1 ratio as the standard for determining ifan individual insurer 
warrants solvency inspection. 
When the cycle turned in the mid-70s, the premium/surplus ratio was as high as 2.8 to 1. 
This was a dangerously high average ratio since many insurers exceeded the 3: 1 NAIC problem 
II "Risk Managers Blame Insurers for Renewal Woes," National Underwriter, January 14, 2002 
12 Named after a famous insurance fmancial writer, Roger Kenny. 
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ratio. When the mid-80s cycle turned, the ratio was as high as 1.8 to 1 - a relatively safe level. 
today's cycle tum, CFA projects the ratio for 200 I year-end to be about L2 to I, extremely 
indeed, overcapitalized. 
ITL llule Facts About l\ledicai Malpractice Claims and Losses 
As the lengthy explanation above demonstrates, the practices of the insurance industry itself 
are to largely to blame for the wildly gyrating business cycle of the last thirty years. Each time 
the cycle turns from a soft to a hard market the response by insurers is predictable: they shift 
from inadequate under-pricing to unconscionable over pricing, cut back on coverage and blame 
large jury verdicts for the problem. It is particularly appalling to see a crisis caused by insurer 
action being blamed, by the very insurers that caused the problem, on others. Insurers seem to 
expect legislators and the American public to swallow the dubious line that trial lawyers have 
managed to time their million-dollar jury verdicts to coincide precisely with the bottom of the 
insurance cycle three times in the last thirty years. Medical malpractice insurance rates are now 
rising fast. Insurers tell the doctors it is the fault of the legal system and urge them to go to state 
legislatures or to Congress and seek restrictions on the rights of their patients. Physician 
associations, unfortunately, are only too willing to accept this faulty logic. 
Although rates are obviously now increasing, medical malpractice insurance losses are not 
"exploding" and have actually declined by one significant measure. CF A's Director of Insurance, 
J. Robert Hunter, conducted an actuarial analysis of medical malpractice insurance using the 
most recent insurance data available from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
and Aivt Best and Company. He found the following: 
I. Inflation-adjusted medical malpractice premiums have declined by one -third in the 
last decade. Exhibit A shows that the average medical malpractice premium per doctor 
barely climbed from $7,701 in 1991 to $7,843 in 2000, an increase of 1.9 percent. Rates 
in constant 2000 dollars have declined by 32.5 percent, when the medical care services 
Consumer Price Index is taken into consideration, It would take a rate increase of 48 
percent to bring premium rates in 2000 back to the 1991 price level. This chart points to 
insurer pricing practices (e.g. under-pricing during a soft market followed by a sharp 
increase in premiums as the market has hardened) as a key culprit in the rate shock that 
many physicians are now experiencing. 
2. l\lcdical malpractice as a percentage of national health care expenditures are a 
fraction of the cost of health care in this nation. Over the last decade, for every $100 
of national health care costs in the United States, medical malpractice insurance cost 
66 cents. In the latest year (2000) the cost is 56 cents, the second lowest rate of the 
decade. Exhibit B shows that malpractice premiums as a share of health costs have 
declined from .95 percent in 1988 to .56 percent in 2000. Medical malpractice insurance 
is actually an amazing value as it covers all medical injuries for about one-half of one 
percent of all health costs. Moreover, this chart shows that proposals to further limit 
patients' rights to sue for medical injuries have little, if any, value in terms oflowering 
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overall health care costs. The maximum potential savings of eliminating all rights for 
injured patients to seek legal redress would be under 60 cents on a $100 medical bill. 
3. There is no "explosion" in the severity of medical malpractice claims . Only about 
one in four persons who bring a claim (24.6%) get any payment at all. Each closed claim 
in America-which includes all million-dollar verdicts-averaged only $27 ,824 for the 
decade ending December 31, 2000. This includes costs for insurer defense and claims 
adjustment. The figures over the decade showed no growth in average paid claim. If one 
looks at average payout just for claims with payments (as opposed to all closed claims) 
the average loss was $112,987. This includes costs for defense of claims settled, 
adjudicated or otherwise closed with no payment, thereby overstating the cost per claim 
paid. (See Exhibit C.) 
4. Medical malpractice insurance losses have risen very slowly . Incurred losses, 
including loss adjustment expense (LAE) has risen by one-half of one percent over the 
last decade on a per-capita basis more than medical inflation. (See Exhibits A and C.) 
Furthermore, Exhibit D shows that medical malpractice losses haven't come anywhere 
close to approaching or exceeding premiums, as they did in the early 1980s. In other 
words, losses have increased on a fairly regular, predictable basis, like most goods and 
services subject to inflation. The problem, as pointed out in 1 above, is that premiums 
have not kept up with losses. 
5. Medical Malpractice profitability over the last decade has been excellent. Despite a 
decline in profitability in the last three years, the average return on net worth for medical 
malpractice lines was still a handsome 12.3% over the last decade. (See Exhibit E.) 
III. Solutions 
Both the states and Congress must act to deal with the true source of the malpractice 
insurance price increases: insurer pricing practices and the volatile insurance cycle. As usual 
with insurance issues, state regulators must take the lead. CF A has called on the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners to thoroughly investigate rate hikes in both personal 
and property/casualty lines and to consider a number of specific reforms to freeze or rollback 
unwarranted rate hikes and to prevent rate shock in the future. States can also take steps to spur 
private market development of increased insurance alternatives (such as captive insurance 
companies, risk retention groups, purchasing groups and the creation of new mutual insurance 
companies) and to increase the availability of insurance through public resources (such as joint 
underwriting associations and insurance facilities.) 
The states could also act to provide relief to the medical specialists, such as obstetricians 
and neurologists, who bear the brunt of medical malpractice costs. The problem, from an 
insurance point-of-view, is that the risk is too concentrated on too few providers. The highest 
risk patients, who have illnesses or conditions where a slight provider error can cause grave harm 
or death, are usually "referred up" from general practitioners and internists to specialists. For 
example, only the very worst risks of all bad backs in a particular state end up being treated by 
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neurosurgeons. Yet a few neurosurgeons bear the full cost of these risks; none of the risk is 
borne by referring physicians. This risk should be spread somewhat, because non-specialist 
physicians benefit financially from this structure (lower risk patients are less costly in 
malpractice terms.) States should consider requiring insurers to impose a "high-risk referral" fee 
on all physicians, that could then be adjusted upward for risk depending on the class of 
practitioner and used to lower insurer costs in the highest-risk classes. 
Congress could act to address rising malpractice rates by creating a national 
reinsurance facility. All insurers writing medical malpractice would be members of the facility. 
Members would cede the premiums and claims over a set catastrophic amount to the facility. 
The facility would take all risk over this retention and would charge an actuarially-based 
premium for this coverage. The premium would NOT be allowed to fluctuate downward during 
the economic cycle of the medical malpractice insurance market, thereby serving to stabilize the 
premium cycle as well as make insurance more readily available through spreading the cost of 
large injuries to a national base. The reinsurance plan would have to be administered by a 
federal agency-the Department of Health and Human Services is probably the best bet-but 
there would be no taxpayer funding. Cost of premiums and of program administration \,.:ould be 
paid out of the premiums ceded to the facility. HHS would utilize the data generated on these 
catastrophic claims to report to Congress on ways to decrease medical errors and malpractice. 
There have been three medical crises, in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s and 
currently. This appears to be (so far) the mildest of the three events in terms of price increases 
and coverage unavailability, even the withdrawal of malpractice insurer St. Paul from the 
market. 
The crises are caused by the economic cycle of the insurance industry. The cost of 
claims has been relatively flat, of the order of $11 0,000 per claim closed with payment and under 
$30,000 per claim closed when those claims closed without payment are included in the averages 
(as they must be since the adjustment expense for such claims is included in the data). 
Thus, in order to control the periodic malpractice insurance rate flare-ups, the cycle must 
be controlled. This requires the discipline of a regulator to do a very difficult thing, keep prices 
somewhat higher than competition would dictate during the "soft" phase of the cycle and escrow 
the excess to help when the "hard" phase sets in. 
The "hard" phase is related to reinsurance becoming unavailable or high priced. This is 
why a national reinsurance facility makes sense. Further, if the facility is regulated by the 
federal government, the go\emment would have incentives to make sure that rates remained 
actuarially sound and stable throughout the cycle and would be able to use the data on large 
claims for risk reduction research. 
IV. Conclm;ion 
A lot is at stake in this debate. The 1999 report regarding medical errors by the Institute 
on Medicine (10M) demonstrates that far too many Americans face the serious possibility of an 
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injury, or even death, due to medical mistakes in the hospital. Using the 10M's low estimate of 
44,000 deaths per year, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of death in this country, 
ahead of breast cancer and AIDS. The 10M's high-range estimate of98,000 deaths a year 
would make medical errors the fifth leading cause of death, more than all accidental deaths. \3 Of 
course, some medical errors are directly attributable to physician negligence and some are not, 
but the 10M report clearly demonstrates the se~ious implications of rolling back the legal rights 
of Americans who have been harmed or killed by malpractice. If Congress gets it wrong, the 
pain and suffering incurred by many families across the country will only increase. 
Before this Committee rushes through tort reform legislation, I urge you to get the facts. 
As the evidence I've presented you with today shows, insurers have only themselves to blame for 
the predicament they-and physicians and patients throughout the country-face. 
13 To Err is Human. Building a Safer Health System. Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; 
November, 1999. 
9 
EXHIBIT A: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS 1991-2000 
U.S.A. AVERAGE MEDICAL 
U.S.A. MEDICAL MED MAL CARE 
NUMBER OF MALPRACTICE PREMIUM SERVICES 
DOCTORS PREM EARNED PER DOCTOR CPI-U 
YEAR (in thousands) U.s.A. 7/1 OF YEAR 
1991 631400 4862170 7700.62 176.1 
1992 652100 5138395 7879.77 189.7 
1993 670300 5174055 7719.01 202.6 
1994 684400 5931898 8667.30 212.6 
1995 720300 6080639 8441.81 223.5 
1996 737800 5992394 8121.98 231.9 
1997 756700 5917038 7819.53 238.7 
1998 777900 6195047 7963.81 246.5 
1999 797600 6155241 7717.20 254.6 
2000 812800 6375401 7843.75 265.6 
1991 to 2000 PERCENT CHANGE 50.8 
RATE INCREASE REQUIRED TO BRING 2000 TO 1991 PRICE LEVEL 
Sources: 
Doctors USA: Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Earned Premiums: NAIC Report on Profit By Line By State 

































EXHIBIT B: RATIO OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUM COSTS 






































PREMIUM AS A % 















14 Best's Aggregates and Averages, 1998 and 2001 Editions. Figures in millions of dollars. Using direct plus assumed slightly 
overstates the size of medical malpractice premiums. 
15 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services web site. 
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EXHIBIT C: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS BY AMERICANS 1991-2000 
Claims Claims USA Number Claims wi Total claims Percent of Paid losses Average Average 
closed closed pay Loss 
with without of Doctors per 100 closed per total claims and LAE Loss for all for paid 
Payment Doctors 
YEAR Payment 100 Doctors With Expense Claims claims only 
payment (000) closed 
1991 30841 75348 631400 4.9 16.8 29.0 3089412 29093.52 100172.24 
1992 31079 82737 652100 4.8 17.5 27.3 3270128 28731.71 105219.86 
1993 32821 87728 670300 4.9 18.0 27.2 3438042 28519.87 104751.29 
1994 31147 92788 684400 4.6 18.1 25.1 3696608 29826.99 118682.63 
1995 31237 94180 720300 4.3 17.4 24.9 3903960 31127.84 124978.71 
1996 30522 92888 737800 4.1 16.7 24.7 3641179 29504.73 119296.87 
1997 24326 79178 756700 3.2 13.7 23.5 2560484 24738.02 105257.09 
1998 17835 67094 777900 2.3 10.9 21.0 2488737 29303.74 139542.30 
1999 10419 50363 797600 1.3 7.6 17.1 1192560 19620.28 114460.12 
2000 3035 22280 812800 0.4 3.1 12.0 204248 8068.26 67297.53 
TOTAL 243262 744584 7241300 3.4 13.6 24.6 27485358 27823.53 112986.65 
EXHIBIT D: PREMIUMS EARNED AND LOSSES INCURRED 1976-2000 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
1-PREMIUM EARNED - LOSSES INCURRED I 








EXHIBIT E: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PROFITABILITY 
1991-2000 
PROFITABILITY DATA --













Average ROR 12.3 
Source: Profitability By-Line, 
By-State, National Association 
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PAGE ONE 
Insurers' Price Wars Contributed 
To Doctors Facing Soaring Costs 
S"".'-.'" 
Lawsuits Alone Didn't Inflate Malpractice Premiums; 
Reserves at St. Paul Distorted Pricing Picture in 1990s 
By RACHEL ZIMMERMAN and CHRISTOPHER OSTER 
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
As medical-malpractice premiums skyrocket in about a dozen states 
across the country, obstetricians and doctors in other risky specialties, 
such as neurosurgery, are moving, quitting or retiring. Insurers and 
many doctors blame the problem on rising jury awards in liability 
lawsuits. 
"The real sickness is people sue at the drop of a hat, judgments are 
going up and up and up, and the people getting rich out of this are the 
plaintiffs' attorneys," says David Golden of the National Association of 
Independent Insurers, a trade group. The American Medical 
Association says Florida, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania and eight 
other states face a "crisis" because "the legal system produces 
multimillion-dollar jury awards on a regular basis." 
But while malpractice litigation has a big effect on premiums, insurers' 
pricing and accounting practices have played an equally important role. 
Following a cycle that recurs in many parts of the business, a price war 
that began in the early 1990s led insurers to sell malpractice coverage 
to obstetrician-gynecologists at rates that proved inadequate to cover 
claims. 
Price Slashing 
Some of these carriers had rushed into malpractice coverage because an 
accounting practice widely used in the industry made the area seem 
more profitable in the early 1990s than it really was. A decade of 
short-sighted price slashing led to industry losses of nearly $3 billion 
last year. 
"I don't like to hear insurance-company executives say it's the tort 
[injury-law] system -- it's self-inflicted," says Donald J. Zuk, chief 
executive of Sepie Hold!l1\!~ Inc., a leading malpractice insurer in 
California. 
What's more, the litigation statistics most insurers trumpet are 
incomplete. The statistics come from Jury Verdict Research, a 
Horsham, Pa., information service, which reports that since 1994, jury 
awards for medical-malpractice cases have jumped 175%, to a median 
of $1 million in 2000. During that seven-year period, the median award 
for negligence in childbirth was $2,050,000 -- the highest for all types 
of medical-malpractice cases, Jury Verdict Research says. (In any 
group of figures, halffall above the median, and half fall below.) 
Gaps in Database 
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But Jury Verdict Research says its 2,95 I-case malpractice database has 
large gaps. It collects award information unsystematically, and it can't 
say how many cases it misses. It says it can't calculate the percentage 
change in the median for childbirth-negligence cases. More important, 
the database excludes trial victories by doctors and hospitals -- verdicts 
that are worth zero dollars. That's a lot to ignore. Doctors and hospitals 
win about 62% of the time, Jury Verdict Research says. A separate 
database on settlements is less comprehensive. 
A spokesman for Jury Verdict Research, Gary Bagin, confirms these 
and other holes in its statistics. He says the numbers nevertheless 
accurately reflect trends. The company, which sells its data to all 
comers, has reported jury information this way since 1961. "If we 
changed now, people looking back historically couldn't compare apples 
to apples," Mr. Bagin says. 
Some doctors are beginning to acknowledge that the conventional 
focus on jury awards deflects attention from the insurance industry'S 
behavior. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
for the first time is conceding that carriers' business practices have 
contributed to the current problem, says Alice Kirkman, a 
spokeswoman for the professional group. "We are admitting it's a much 
more complex problem than we have previously talked about," she 
says. 
Scrambling for Doctors 
The upshot is beyond dispute: Pregnant women across the country are 
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scrambling for medical attention. Kimberly Maugaotega of Las Vegas is 13 weeks pregnant and hasn't seen 
an obstetrician. When she learned she was expecting, the 33-year-old mother of two called the doctor who 
delivered her second child but was told he wasn't taking any new pregnant patients. Dr. Shelby Wilbourn 
plans to leave Nevada because of soaring medical-malpractice insurance rates there. Ms. Maugaotega says 
she called 28 obstetricians but couldn't find one who would take her. 
/~~ 
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Frustrated, she called the office of Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn. A staff member 
gave her yet another name. She made an appointment to see that doctor today but 
says she is skeptical about the quality of care she will receive. 
In the Las Vegas area, doctors say some 90 obstetricians have stopped accepting 
new patients since Sl. Paul Cos., formerly the country's leading provider of 
malpractice coverage, quit the business in December. St. Paul had insured more 
than half of Nevada's 240 obstetricians. Carriers still offering coverage in the state 
have raised rates by 100% to 400%, physicians say. 
'11"'l" "--"" 
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,1,1. I' I Dr. Wilbourn says his annual malpractice premium was due to jump to $108,000 ~'~l (. ~, next month, from $33,000. The 41-year-old solo practitioner says the increase ~J ~., .::Jii,· : ',,/:;'" would come straight out of his take-home pay of between $150,000 and $200,000 a 
Kimberly Maugautega year. In response, he is moving to Maine this summer. 
Dr. Wilbourn mourns having "to pick up and leave the patients I cared for and the practice I built up over 
12 years." But in Maine, he has found a $200,000-a-year position with an insurance premium of only 
$9,800 for the first year, although the rate rises significantly after that. Premiums in Maine are relatively 
low because a dominant doctor-owned insurance cooperative there hasn't pushed to maximize rates, the 
heavily rural population isn't notably litigious and its court system employs an expert panel to screen out 
some suits, says Insurance Commissioner Alessandro Iuppa. 
Until the 1970s, few doctors faced big-dollar suits. Malpractice coverage was a small specialty. As courts 
expanded liability rules, malpractice suits became more common. Dozens of doctor-owned insurance 
cooperatives, or "bedpan mutuals," formed in response. Most stuck to their home states. 
St. Paul, a mid-sized national carrier named for its base in Minnesota, saw an 
opportunity. An insurer of Main Street businesses, St. Paul became the leader in 
the malpractice field. By 1985, it had a 20% share of the national market. Overall, 
the company had revenue of $8.9 billion last year, with about 10% of its premium 
dollars coming from malpractice coverage. 
The frequency and size of doctors' malpractice claims rose steadily in the early 
1980s, industry officials say. St. Paul and its competitors raised rates sharply 
during the 1980s. 
Expecting malpractice awards to continue rising rapidly, St. Paul increased its 
reserves. But the company miscalculated, says Kevin Rehnberg, a senior vice 
president. Claim frequency and size leveled off in the late 1980s, as more than 30 
states enacted curbs on malpractice awards, Mr. Rehnberg says. The combination 
of this so-called tort reform and the industry'S rate increases turned malpractice 
insurance into a very lucrative specialty. 
A standard industry accounting device used by St. Paul and, on a smaller scale, by its rivals, made the field 
look even more attractive. Realizing that it had set aside too much money for malpractice claims, St. Paul 
"released" $1.1 billion in reserves between 1992 and 1997. The money flowed through its income 
statement and boosted its bottom line. 
St. Paul stated clearly in its annual reports that excess reserves had enlarged its net income. But that part of 
the message didn't get through to some insurers -- especially bedpan mutuals -- dazzled by St. Paul's 
bottom line, according to industry officials. 
In the 1990s, some bedpan mutuals began competing for business beyond their original territories. New 
Jersey's Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, California's Southern California Physicians Insurance 
Exchange (now known as Scpie Holdings), and Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Co., or Phico, fanned out 
across the country. Some publicly traded insurers also jumped into the business. 
With St. Paul seeming to offer a model for big, quick profits, "no one wanted to sit still in their own 
backyard," says Scpie's Mr. Zuk. "The boards of directors said, 'We've got to grow.' " Scpie expanded into 
Connecticut, Florida and Texas, among other states, starting in 1997. 
As they entered new areas, smaller carriers often tried to attract customers by undercutting St. Paul. The 
price slashing became contagious, and premiums fell in many states. The mutuals "went in and aggravated 
the situation by saying, 'Look at all the money St. Paul is making,' " says Tom Gose, President of MAG 
Mutual Insurance Co., which operates mainly in Georgia. "They came in late to the dance and undercut 
everyone." 
WSJ.com - Major Business News 
SOARING PREMIUMS 
Insurance·irdustry accoonting and pricing prac: ces have contributed to sharply rising medical-mal.:lractce rates 
that are causing doctors in some states lo quit or Move . 
• Stifles 10 'crisis' 






The newer competitors soon discovered, however, that "the so-called profitability of the '90s was the result 
of those years in the mid-80s when the actuaries were predicting the terrible trends," says Donald J. Fager, 
president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co., a bedpan mutual started in 1975 in New York. Except 
for two mergers in the past two years, his company mostly has held to its original single-state focus. 
The competition intensified, even though some insurers "knew rates were inadequate from 1995 to 2000" to 
cover malpractice claims, says Bob Sanders, an actuary with Milliman USA, a Seattle consultancy serving 
insurance companies. 
Alleged Fraud 
In at least one case, aggressive pricing allegedly crossed the line into fraud. Pennsylvania regulators last 
year filed a civil suit in state court in Harrisburg against certain executives and board members of Phico. 
The state alleges the defendants misled the company's board on the adequacy of Phi co's premium rates and 
funds set aside to pay claims. On the way to becoming the nation's seventh-largest malpractice insurer, the 
company had suffered mounting losses on policies for medical offices and nursing homes as far away as 
Miami. 
Pennsylvania regulators took over Phi co last August. The company filed for bankruptcy-court protection 
from its creditors in December. A trial date hasn't been set for the state fraud suit. Phico executives and 
directors have denied wrongdoing. 
In the late 1990s, the size of payouts for malpractice awards increased, carriers say. By 2000, many 
companies were losing money on malpractice coverage. Industrywide, carriers paid out $1.36 in claims and 
expenses for every premium dollar they collected, says Mr. Golden, the trade-group official. 
The losses were exacerbated by carriers' declining investment returns. Some insurers had come to expect 
that big gains in the 1990s from their bond and stock portfolios would continue, industry officials say. 
When the bull market stalled in 2000, investment gains that had patched over inadequate premium rates 
disappeared. 
Some bedpan mutuals went home. Scpie stopped writing coverage in any state other than California. "We 
lost money, and we retreated," says the company's Mr. Zuk. 
New Jersey's Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, now known as MIIX, had expanded into 24 states by the 
time it had a loss of $ I 64 million in the fourth quarter of 200 I. The company says it is now refusing to 
renew policies for 7,000 physicians outside of New Jersey. It plans to reformulate as a new company 
operating only in that state. 
St. Paul's malpractice business sank into the red. Last December, newly hired Chief Executive Jay 
Fishman, a former Cill!.!rt\U]1 Inc. executive, announced the company would drop the coverage line. St. Paul 
reported a $980 million loss on the business for 200 I. 
As carriers retrench, competition has slumped and prices in some states have shot up. Lauren Kline, 6Y2 
months pregnant, changed obstetricians when her long-time Philadelphia doctor moved out of state because 
of rate increases. Now, her new doctor, Robert Friedman, may have to give up delivering babies at his 
suburban Philadelphia practice. His insurance expires at the end of the month, and he says he is having 
difficulty finding a carrier that will sell him a policy at any price. 
Last year, Dr. Friedman says he paid $50,000 for coverage. Ifhe gets a policy for next year, it will cost 
$90,000, he predicts, based on his broker's estimate. "I can't pass a single bit of that off to my patients," 
because managed-care companies don't allow it, he says. 
Dr. Friedman says he is considering dropping the obstetrics part of his practice. Generally, delivering 
babies is seen as posing greater risks than most gynecological treatment. As a result, insurers offer 
less-expensive policies to doctors who don't do deliveries. 
Mr. Golden of the insurers' association argues that whatever role industry practices may play, the current 
turmoil stems from lawsuits. The association says that from 1995 through 2000, total industry payouts to 
cover losses and legal expenses jumped 52%, to $6.9 billion. "That says there are more really huge 
verdicts," Mr. Golden says. Even in the majority of cases in which doctors and hospitals win -- the 
zero-dollar verdicts -- there are still legal expenses that insurers have to pick up, he adds. 
Industry critics point to different sets of statistics. Bob Hunter, director for insurance at Consumer 
Federation of America, an advocacy group in Washington, prefers numbers generated by A.M. Best Co. 
The insurance-rating agency estimates that once all malpractice claims from 199 I through 2000 are 
resolved -- which will take until about 2010 -- the average payout per claim will have risen 47%, to 
$42,473. That projection includes legal expenses and suits in which doctors or hospitals prevail. 
While the statistical debate rages, pregnant women adjust to new limits and inconveniences. Kelly 
Biesecker, 35, spent many extra hours on the highway this spring, driving from her home in Villanova, Pa., 
to Delran, N.J., so she could continue to use her obstetrician. Dr. Richard Krauss says he moved the 
obstetrics part of his practice from Philadelphia because malpractice rates had skyrocketed in Pennsylvania. 
Ms. Biesecker, who gave birth to a healthy boy on June 5, says Dr. Krauss was the doctor she trusted to 
guard her health and the health of her baby: "You stick with that guy no matter what the distance." 
Dr. Krauss, 53, left Philadelphia last year only after his malpractice premium rose to $54,000, from 
$38,000, and then was canceled by a carrier getting out of the business, he says. After getting quotes of 
about $80,000 on a new policy, he moved. New Jersey hasn't been a panacea, however. His policy there 
expires July 1, and the carrier refuses to renew it. The doctor says he hopes to go to work for a hospital that 
will pay for his coverage. 
Write to Rachel Zimmerman at r<lchcl.zillll1lcl"lll;lIl II \\ sj .c(\rl1 and Christopher Oster at 
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Back on, the tort reform merry-go-round 
T hose of us who have been around a while are used to the cyclical nature of medical malpractice insurance.. Every 10 . years or so there's a huge jump in premium costs, always accompanied by a damor for limiting plaintiffs' rights to sue 
and collect for pain and suffering. And each time around, providers 
have joined in pursuit of the wrong culprit ' 
This year, the uproar is the loudest yet, and though, Congress is 
unlikely to adopta national tort monn law (despite the American Med-
ical Association's best efforts), governors and state legislatures from New 
Jersey to Nevada are scmnbling to respond. ' 
For hospitals and physicians, this crisis is very real. Mal-
practice premiums are skyrocketing, and some doctors can't 
even find coverage, opting to "go bare," Worst hit is obstetrics, 
with some physicians picking up their practices and movingto 
states with lower premiums and less litigious resideAts, Hospi-
tals in a number of sl.ates are self-insuring and paying dearly 
for "excess coverage" of claims 'that go beyond their set-asides. 
Now the insurers have reached back into their bag of tricks, pointing 
the finger of blame at our litigiQ~ society, The problem is, our society 
waJi litigious a muple of years ago, too, but we didn't see big premium 
increases then, To listen to the industry and its unwitting provider allies, 
America'4 juries go haywire every 10 years or so, only to become socially 
responsible once msurance profits go bacle up. 
The study being used to bolster such claims--c.omplled by Jury Ver-
dict Research-found that since 1994, jury awards for medical malprac-
tice cases have jumped 175%, to a median of$l million in 20()(), with the 
average settlement being $3.5 million. That's shocking. at least until you 
read the fine print 
TODD 
When the Wall Sh'eet JournalQ}led, Jury Verdict admitted 
that its 2,951-case malpractice d'atabase has large gaps in it "It 
collects award information unsystematically, and it can't say 
how many cases it misses," the Journal reported. Maury Ver-
dict} says it can't calculate the percentage cb~ge in the 
median for childbirth. negligence cases. More important, the 
database excludes trial victories by doctors and hospitals-
verdicts tllat are worth zero dollars. A separate database on 
'settlements is less comprehensive." 
Things turned dramatic earlier this month, when Univer-
sity Medical Center in Las Vegas closed its Level J trawna 
center, the only such facility in a four-state region, after sur-, 
geons refused to work there unless lawmakers stopped the ' 
big malpractice awards. Nevada Gov. ICenny Guinn quickly ~OANE , 
called for a special legislative session to capitulate to the docs. .As.s/S~nt ManaKlng 
Meanwhile, a study by the Physician Insure.rsAssociation of 
America found that the average payout by indivldual de.fm.. 
dants in 2000 was $328,396. Then AM. Best Co., an insur-
ance-rating agency, came out with an estimate that once an 
malpractice claims from 1991 through 2000 are resolved. 
In truth, the medical liability insurance crisis has very little to Edltor/Op-Ed 
do with jury awards and everything to do with an out-of-control 
insurance induslly. Insurers such as St Paul Cos. and PHICO Insurance ' 
Co, engaged in a premium price war in the 1990s, using the go-go stock 
market to cover the sprr.ld, The invested reserves grew so large that some of 
the funds were released to the bottom line as profit Meanwhile, PHIOO 
and other mutuals that had been start:d by providers overexpanded. 
Then the music stopped at the stodt party, leaving most "med mal" 
insurers scrambling. either out of the market or toward huge premium 
increases. PHlCO is in bankruptcy and its executives and directors are 
awaiting trial in a state fraud laWSUit., 
wJlich wiD take until about 2010, the average: payout per claim will have 
risen 47%, to $42,473. That projection includes legal expenses and suits 
in which doctors or hospitals prevail This crisis is shrinking. 
A coaliti9t) of consumer groups and some members of Congreu 
have called for a General Accounting Office Investigation of the insur-
ance industry's responsibility for creating nationwide medical mal-
practice insurance problems for doctors. That's a start. In the longer 
term. self-insurance through shared-risk pools may be: the solution, so 
we don't have to go through another cycle like this one again. 
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The following tenns are used in this report: 
"Medical error" or "error" - The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a 
wrong action to achieve an aim. Errors can include problems in practice, products, procedures, and 
systems. 
"Adverse outcomes" - Undesirable and unintended outcomes of care such as death, disability, or tempo-
rary disability. 1 
"Adverse events" - Undesirable and unintended incidents in care that may result in adverse outcomes or 
may require additional care efforts to thwart an adverse outcome? 
"Adverse drug event" - an adverse event attributable to the administration of a drug. 
"Adverse event indicators" - the 3 broad and 37 refined categories indicating misadventures of surgical 
and medical care, complications of surgical and medical procedures, and adverse drug events, which are 
listed in Table 1. 
"Preventable adverse events" - a subset of adverse outcomes that are judged to have been avoidable if 
appropriate and reasonable steps had been taken.3 
"Near misses" - Events in which the unwanted consequences were prevented because the failure was 
identified, and corrected. Such a recovery could be by a planned or unplanned barrier.4 
"System" - Set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common aim. These elements may be 
both human and nonhuman (equipment, technologies, etc.). 6 
"Complications of medical care"- Concurrence of injuries, lesions, or diseases with another disease 
due to medical care. 
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Executive Summary 
The United States' health care system, while known to offer the most technically advanced healthcare, is 
characterized by unacceptably high levels of adverse events due to medical errors. Proper investigation, 
data collection and analysis are critical first steps to effective prevention. 
This report is the first attempt in Utah to use the hospital discharge abstracts and International Classification 
of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, including E-codes, to estimate the 
frequency of occurrence, trends and patterns of risk of adverse events related to medical care. This report 
should help inform healthcare workers of the existence and potential value ofthese data, and attract their 
attention to the problem of patient safety. The report also proposes a classification scheme for adverse 
events, using ICD-9-CM codes. Although limited, the proposed classification should prompt dialogue and 
feedback to further refine this classification scheme. In the interim, this scheme can equip analysts with a tool 
to sensibly categorize adverse events. 
Methods 
This report captures assessments and evaluations from the 1995-99 inpatient hospital discharge abstract 
from acute care hospitals in Utah. ICD-9-CM codes currently used in hospital discharge records have been 
used to identify three main categories and 37 subcategories of adverse events. Tables and graphs depict 
variations in numbers and rates of adverse events by risk factors such as age, sex, and hospital characteris-
tics (urban vs. rural, teaching vs. non-teaching, and accredited by Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Health Organizations (JCAHO) vs. non-JCAHO). 
Limitations 
These data have important limitations, including: 
• our inability to separate adverse events prior to hospitalization from those occurring during hospital-
ization, 
• our inability to determine the clinical significance of the event, and 
• our inability to distinguish variation in completeness of reporting from variation in true occurrence of 
adverse events. 
Results 
• From 1995 to 1999 in Utah, about one in 250 hospital discharges or 4,248 patients had a "misad-
venture of surgical and medical care," (a term used in the ICD-9-CM Codes Book to imply that 
the event occurred as a result of an error) with an overwhelming majority ofthose (93% or 3,939 
discharges) comprising cuts, punctures, or perforations during medical care. 
• A total of 60,000 (6 % of all discharges) involved other adverse events (ICD-9-CM category 
"complications of medical and surgical procedures"). 
• Finally, 25,000 discharges (2.5 %) involved complications of medications. (See Table 1) 
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• No substantial annual variation existed for any ofthe adverse events (See page 13.) 
• A slightly greater proportion of males suffered adverse events than females. However, the actual 
number of adverse events was considerably higher for women because they were hospital more 
often than men (See page 14.) 
• The rate of adverse events increased substantially with age. Older patients were at a higher risk, 
probably because they tended to have more complex conditions than other patients. (See page 16.) 
• Patients in urban hospitals, teaching hospitals, and JCAHO-accredited hospitals reported higher 
rates of adverse events, particularly complications of medications. This is likely due to higher volume 
and acuity of patients, and possibly more accurate reporting of adverse events (See page 18.) 
Conclusions 
There is growing recognition that the health care system is not as safe as it can be. Information about 
frequency of errors and other adverse events is needed to guide and evaluate improvement in the healthcare 
system. This report used the available data from the Utah Hospital Discharge Database to provide informa-
tion on adverse events during medical care. 
Despite their limitations, these data add to the evidence presented in the Institute of Medicine 's report, "To 
Error is Human", that the healthcare system can be made safer. The Utah Department of Health has been 
working in partnership with Utah hospitals and healthcare providers, to address this challenge. The Utah 
Hospital Association (UHA),jointiy with Utah Medical Association, HealthInsight, and Utah Department of 
Health (UDOH), has organized a Utah Hospital Patient Safety Task Force 
As part of its efforts, that Task Force has helped the Utah Department of Health to develop two proposed 
administrative rules. One ofthese proposed rules would call upon hospitals to establish a mechanism to 
prevent adverse drug events. The other calls upon hospitals to report sentinel health events and establish a 
review process for such events designed to identifY and remedy their root causes. The Utah Department of 
Health's Utah Health Data Committee is committed to work collaboratively with these parties to provide 
information to assist with these efforts. 
IV 
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Medical Mistakes Make Life Busier for E.~. 
, 'bed drugs bring thousands to hOSPItalS Utah Health Department says errors, allergIes to prescn . 
of medical treatment really stuck out. 
BY NORMA WAGNER 
© 2000. THE SALT LAKE TRlBUNg 
A state Department of Health analys.is 
shows thousands of Utahns end up m 
hospital emergency rooms for care cost· 
ing more than $40 ~illion ~cause of 
mistakes made durmg medlcal treat· 
ment, mostly medication errors but also 
side effects from the drugs they are 
prescribed. 
For the second year in a row, the 
health department analyzed records from 
hospitals statewide in an effort to design 
prevention programs to. reduce 
emergency· room visits, whlch cost 
nearly $700 million in 1997 - the latest 
year for which such emergency·room 
data has been compiled. . 
"The adverse effects of medl~ t:eat· 
ment constituted 4.7 percent of all mJury· 
and poisoning·related emergency depart· 
ment encounters, claiming a total charge 
of $40,076,396," said Don Wood, program 
director of the Bureau of Emergency 
Medical Services. "So the adverse effects 
"It can be anything from the guy who 
has a sponge left in him from surgery 
who leaves the hospital and a day late: 
has an infee'j'.m , .. to probl<:m.s asS?Cl' 
ated with n . .:dication admmlstration 
problems, the wrong medicat~on or the 
wrong dose and not necessru:il~ by the 
hospital, but by a private physlclan or an 
urgent care clinic. And these people get 
charged for that mistake because they 
Sec MEDICAL, Page A-6 




• Continued from A-I 
end up in the emergency room." 
Still, the data is not specific 
enough yet to discern which prob-
lems resulted from poor medical 
care or simply a patient's bad re-
action to the drug they were pre· 
scribed, Wood pointed out. 
"We know the majority are 
medication administration prob-
lems, but it doesn't mean that all of 
them were given a wrong medica-
tion or dose," Wood said. "Some 
could result from an allergic reac-
tion to the medication. Give us five 
years and we'll start getting there, 
figuring it out." 
Wood and his colleagues also 
analyzed 1996 emergency·room de· 
partment data, but he said two 
years' worth of number· crunching 
does not leave much room for ana· 
lyzing trends. The number of 
emergency·room visits in 1996 
involved 502,000 patients, com-
pared with 562,000 in 1997. 
The total charges for outpatient 
treatment for adverse effects from 
medical treatment increased from 
$29 million to $40 million, "but 
there were 60,000 more patients in 
1997," Wood said, "and the cost of 
medicine goes up every year." 
What struck him equally in the 
report was the utilization ofhospi-
tal emergency rooms, though no 
other state he knows of gathers the 
data so it is hard to tell how Utah 
compares. 
"What we do know is that about 
one in four Utahns utilizes the 
emergency room for whatever rea-
son. It may be that they don't have 
insurance or they're under insured 
so they use the E.R., or they don't 
have a primary care physician," he 
said. "Then we also have all these 
motor vehicle accidents and a 
whole slew of other reasons that 
result in trauma. We're a recre· 
ation state, after all. Look at all the 
opportunities we have for injury. 
Maybe that's why we have such a 
high number of falls. " 
Falls and car crashes were 
logged among the most frequent 
causes of unintentional injury that 
required hospitalization. with an 
average charge of $8,286 for falls 
and $13,808 for motor vehicle 
accidents. 
Wood said hospitals, which pro· 
vide his department with the in-
formation, can use the Utah Emer· 
gency Department Encounter Data 
Report to better gear their services 
to provide better care for their pa-
tients and, along with the Health 
Department, use the date to plan 
prevention programs. 
"If the report shows that of the 
100,000 people coming into their 
emergency room every year are 
geriatric patients, they may want 
to focus more on geriatric treat-
ment," Wood said. 
"If Primary Children's Medical 
Center starts seeing increasing 
numbers of injuries due to falls, 
whether it's a 1·to-4·year·old falling 
ofr steps or a 10-to·12-year-old fall-
.ing otT their Rollerblades, they can 
look at that and do something with 
it. 
"That's what we're here to do." 
As Wood's bureau has grown 
accustomed to crunching the data, 
it is getting better at it, and faster. 
"We expect the 1998 report to be 
done within 60 to 90 days," he said, 
"and to be right up to date with this 
information one year from now." 
If you are interested in purchasing the 
increased MEDEFENSE limits or would 
like an application to apply for the 
separate "BILLING ERRORS AND 
OMISSIONS COVERAGE" and have 
not received a separate mailing with a 
postcard to change or add this additional 
coverage please contact Marlene 
Hotchkiss or Stewart Pierce at 801-531-
0375 or 1-800-748-4380. 
Claim Summary 2000 
UMIA is committed to 
communicating as much information as 
possible to our members about issues that 
impact health care professionals. Many of 
our members have expressed an interest 
in receiving information about the Claim 
Department activity and want to be kept 
abreast of claims as they develop. 
Claims by Specialty 
IOB/GYN 383 
I Family Practice 
I General Surgery 
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In 2000, the Claim Department 
opened 394 new claims and closed 380 
claims. Of claims closed, 32% involved a 
settlement payment to patients; 68% 
closed without a payment to the patient. 
Of the closed claims in 2000, five 
went to trial and were all defense verdicts 
in favor of the physician. The cost to 
defend these five claims was $637,600. 
The average cost for these five claims 
was $127,500 with the low being $34,900 
and the high $213,000. 
10 year Claim data 1991 -2000 
During the past ten years from 
January 1, 1991 through December 31, 
2000 there have been 3,263 claim 
reported to UMIA. During this 10-year 
time frame 825 claims closed with a 
payment and 2,438 closed without any 
payment being made. Our reported 
claims for the past 10 years are listed by 
medical specialty and the type of claims 
below. 
Type of Claims 
I Surgery 1 
Post-op Complications 483 
Surgical error/injury 440 
Retained foreign body 93 
I Failure/delay Diagnose 1 I Cancer 1 228 I Fracture/dislocation 1 138 I Infection 1 I 110 1 
1 Cardiac related II 69 1 I Pregnancy related II 25 1 
I I I I 
6/2412002 
Other UI 3981 
Improper Treatment 
I Drug side effect 
Insufficient Therapy 
I Cardiology I Incorrect medication 
! Otolaryngology 48 Fracture/dislocation 
! Urgent Care 34 Lack of supervision 
!vascular Surgery 1 I 32 1 I Infection I Psychiatry I 301 I X-ray related 1 141 I Neurology I 281 I During exam 1 81 I Gynecoolgy I 28 1 
ology Obstetrical birth injury 188 
Anesthesia related 136 
I Fen/Phen 60 
ConsenVConfidentiality 
Abandonment 
I Equipment failure 
3263 I Other 
'.~jjl1 fE::,~t;~ta I 
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